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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays that investigate inequality within the household with
a particular focus on the effects of intra-household resource allocation and informal child
fostering on the welfare of children. The first essay estimates individual resource shares within
Ghanaian households using a modern household collective model. Individual poverty rates are
also determined and compared to standard per-capita poverty indices. Our findings show that
mothers, along with their children, tend to be more vulnerable to poverty than fathers because
mothers tend to bear most of the cost of having children.
Applying the same model to a panel data set of households, the second chapter conducts
a comparative study of children’s resource shares between male-headed and female-headed
households in Jamaica. The results indicate that children tend to be allocated a higher share
of resources in female-headed households and hence may not be necessarily poorer in terms of
resource shares than children in male-headed households.
The final essay investigates the effects of child fostering on two educational outcomes of
children in Jamaica - school attendance and the number of years of schooling. We find that being
a foster child in itself has a negative impact on the number of schooling years a child accumulates
but has no significant effect on school attendance.Our findings also indicate that the impact
of Jamaica’s main social transfer programme on the education of children is dependent on the
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Research that focuses on assessing the impact of intra-household inequality on measures of
poverty and policy making is still in its infant phase. In fact, standard headline measures of
poverty and inequality usually neglect the existence of inequality within the household by using
per-capita calculations which may be equivalised to account for the fact that different members
of the household have different basic needs (for instance, the basic needs of a child are less
than those of an adult). All the same, the underlying assumption for these calculations is that
all members of the household are treated equally, such that, if one member of the household
is categorized as poor then all other members are also deemed as poor. A major contributing
factor for this is the fact that most of the households surveys on which these calculations are
based collect consumption and expenditure data at the household level and not at the individual
level.
Nevertheless, studies such as Sahn and Younger (2009) and Haddad and Kanbur (1990)
have used anthropometric measures such as weight, height, and caloric intake to show that
high levels of inequality could exist within households, especially in developing countries.
Using body mass index (BMI) data, Sahn and Younger (2009) show that inequality within the
household can account for more than half of total inequality in the 7 countries they examine.
Haddad and Kanbur (1990) also use data on calorie adequacy in the Philippines to measure
inequality within the household and find that neglecting intra-household inequality could cause
overall estimates of inequality to be underestimated by about 30%. According to Kanbur
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(2016), ignoring the possibility that certain members of the household may be particularly
disadvantaged after resources are allocated could have other far-reaching consequences including
the poor targeting of social protection programmes that aim to reduce poverty and inequality
and the miscalculation of the effects of minimum wage policy on poverty.
The most recent approach to measuring individual well-being is to model the household
decision-making process using a collective model. Pioneered by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and
Apps and Rees (1988), the collective household model was developed following the rejection
of the earliest model of the household - the unitary model. The unitary model assumes away
the complex interactions that take place within a household treating households as individuals
(Becker, 1964, 1965). Alderman et al. (1995) and Browning et al. (2014) provide excellent
reviews of this model and the reasons behind its rejection within the literature. The collective
model, on the other hand, allows each individual within the household to have separate
preferences and hence makes room for the possibility that the preferences of one household
member may conflict those of another. In fact, a subset of this category of household models
use tools from game theory to model bargaining within the household (Manser and Brown, 1980;
McElroy and Horney, 1981). More recent variants of the collective model such as Browning
et al. (2013), Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), Bargain et al. (2010), Bargain and Donni (2012)
and Bargain et al. (2014) estimate individual resource shares by imposing restrictions on the
preferences of household members.
Focusing particularly on child welfare, this thesis employs and further develops one of such
models to investigate intra-household inequality in two developing countries. This collective
model, developed by Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013) (DLP hereafter), offers the most
attractive framework for the present study because of its empirical tractability, its suitability
to the developing-country context, and most importantly, its focus on estimating the resource
shares of children. This thesis focuses on children for two main reasons. First, children are likely
to be the most vulnerable members of the household because they are not given the opportunity
to choose which household to belong to, they cannot leave at will, and are not likely to contribute
significantly to household income. Second, the well-being of children has implications for the
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intergenerational transmission of poverty, that is, poor children are generally more likely to
become poor adults in the future (Chiappori and Meghir, 2014).
This thesis is composed mainly of three separate but related empirical essays which are
written in a standard economic journal article format. The first empirical chapter investigates
intra-household resource allocation in Ghana, a lower-middle income country located in sub-
Saharan Africa. The DLP collective model is applied to the most recent round of the national
household survey known as the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) to estimate the
proportion of total household expenditure allocated to each member of the nuclear monogamous
household, namely the father, the mother, and the children. Estimated resource shares are then
used to compute individual poverty rates which are compared to standard per-capita rates. The
results show that for the sample, standard poverty indices mostly underestimate rates of poverty
by an error margin ranging from 2% to 12%. Our findings also indicate that while fathers have
a significantly higher proportion of resources allocated to them, mothers tend to bear most of
the cost of having children. Hence, mothers and children tend to be more vulnerable to poverty
than fathers, especially in larger households. To demonstrate the usefulness of this kind of
analysis for social transfer programmes, we discuss the implications of the results and make a
few recommendations for the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme,
a conditional cash transfer programme in Ghana aimed at reducing extreme poverty.
The second essay conducts a comparative study of the welfare of children in male-headed
and female-headed households using a rotating panel data set of households from 21 rounds of
the Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions (1990 to 2010). The motivation behind this study
stems from the fact that compared to male-headed households, female-headed households are
likely to be more vulnerable to shocks and disadvantaged in labour and credit markets (Boxill
and Quarless, 2005; Zeller and Sharma, 1997). Moreover, the incidence of female headship is
growing across the world; recent estimates put the proportion of female heads between 20% and
35% in the developing world (United Nations, 2017). Jamaica is an interesting test case for this
kind of study because its matrifocal culture is characterized by a very high incidence of female-
headed households (Safa, 2007). According to an executive summary of the 2012 Jamaican
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Survey of Living Conditions, about 45% of the households in Jamaica are headed by women,
a significant proportion of whom are single mothers (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2012).
This essay exploits the panel nature of the data set to improve the empirical identification
of resource shares by accounting for unobserved heterogeneities within households that could
cause other variables to be endogenous. To do this, we incorporate Mundlak’s (1978) approach
to panel data into DLP’s non-linear model. In particular, we include time averages of all time-
varying explanatory variables (also known as Mundlak terms) into the DLP model to account
for unobserved household characteristics which do not vary over time. The results indicate that
ignoring unobserved heterogeneities could result in biased estimates of resource shares. We also
find that children in poorer female-headed households are not necessarily worse-off as women,
relative to men, tend to spend more on child-specific goods like health and education.
Veering away from the collective household model, the final empirical study analyses
inequality within the household by investigating the effects of the practice of child fostering on
the educational outcomes (school attendance and the number of years of schooling) of children
in Jamaica. Informal child fostering rates are known to be particularly high in sub-Saharan
Africa and in the Caribbean (Zimmerman, 2003). A foster child, for our purposes, is defined as
a child living apart from both biological parents. According to Hamilton (1964), an individual
tends to more altruistic towards another individual, the more closely related he/she is to that
individual. This implies that, the welfare of foster children is likely to be generally lower than
that of biological children. While there are many empirical studies that analyse this practice
in Africa (see for example, Akresh (2004), Akresh (2009), and Cichello (2003)), it is rare to
find one that focuses on the Caribbean region. This is probably because of the absence of data
sets suitable for this kind of work. This study attempts to address these issues in a number of
ways. First and foremost, a rotating panel data set of children is constructed from the panel
data set of households used in the second essay. Due to limitations in the data collected, we
are able to use only six rounds of the Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions: 2004, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009, and 2010. Similar to the second essay, the panel data set is exploited to account
for unobserved child and household heterogeneities which are time invariant by applying child
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and household fixed effects. Again, this ensures that endogeneity within the empirical model is
dealt with (to a large degree, at least). The results after estimating two fixed effects regression
models (one for each educational outcome) show that while being a foster child in itself does
not affect a child’s school attendance, it has a significant and negative effect on the number of
years of schooling that the child accumulates. Our findings also indicate that the impact that
Jamaica’s Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) has on a child’s
education is dependent on the fostering status of that child.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The first essay, "Intra-household Resource
Allocation and Poverty: The Ghanaian Case" is presented in Chapter 2. The second essay,
"Children’s Resource Shares: Male versus Female-headed Households" is presented in Chapter
3. The third essay, "Child Fostering and the Educational Outcomes of Jamaican Children" is




and Poverty: The Ghanaian Case
Abstract
Most standard poverty indices are determined using per-capita calculations and hence
ignore intra-household inequality. Using the largest and most recent household survey data set
available for Ghana, we investigate power dynamics in the household by estimating the share of
total resources allocated to each member of the household using a collective model developed by
Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013). These resource shares are used to compute individual
poverty rates for household members. Our findings indicate that while fathers command a
significantly larger share of household resources than mothers, mothers tend to bear a higher
proportion of the cost of children, resulting in a higher incidence of poverty in Ghana for women
and children. The results also indicate that poverty in Ghana is mostly underestimated when
standard poverty measures are used, especially with respect to women and children. Finally, we
discuss the implications of the results for the LEAP programme, a social cash transfer scheme
aimed at reducing extreme poverty in Ghana.
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2.1 Introduction
Although advances have been made in estimating resource shares within the household, most
measures of poverty implicitly assume that resources are shared equally amongst household
members. Using health measures such as weight, height, and calorie intake, studies such as
Haddad and Kanbur (1990) have shown that with fewer resources to go round, intra-household
inequality is likely to be particularly high in poor regions. Therefore, assessing the share
of resources that each household member commands is indispensable in understanding the
nature of poverty in these deprived areas. Moreover, this kind of study makes available crucial
information that policy makers need in the planning and execution of effective redistributive
policies. According to the World Bank (2016), over half of the extreme poor live in sub-Saharan
Africa making this region the poorest in the world. Studies of intra-household inequality in
sub-Saharan African countries are however, relatively, few.
This essay contributes to the literature on sub-Saharan Africa by investigating intra-
household resource allocation in Ghana, a lower-middle income country located along the
West African coast. With a per-capita GDP of US$3,940 (using 2011 purchasing power parity
prices) in 2013, about a quarter of its population of roughly 26 million is estimated to be poor.
The economy of Ghana is still quite dependent on agriculture with 52% of households owning
farms and 45% of the economically active population working in the agricultural sector (Ghana
Statistical Service, 2014b). Ghana is suitable for an analysis of this kind for two reasons. First,
although poverty rates are declining in Ghana, poverty reduction is dampened significantly by
increasing inequality in household consumption. According to Cooke et al. (2016), the Gini
index for the country increased from 37.5 to 40.8 between 1992 and 2013. Identifying the
household members that are disproportionately poor is therefore crucial if this trend is to be
reversed. Second, we exploit the largest and most recent household survey data set for Ghana,
the Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 6 (GLSS 6). This data set is suited to the kind
of analysis we carry out in this essay because the household expenditure module is highly
disaggregated and particularly rich.
By applying a collective household model originally developed by Dunbar, Lewbel, and
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Pendakur (2013) (DLP hereafter) to a sample drawn from GLSS 6, we propose estimates of
resource shares for individual household members and compute poverty rates that are adjusted
for unequal resource allocation within the household. To the best of my knowledge, this study is
the first to estimate resource shares for Ghanaian households and one of the rare applications of
collective models to developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Other applications of collective
models in sub-Saharan Africa include DLP and Bargain, Donni, and Kwenda (2014) (BDK
hereafter), which estimate resource shares for nuclear households in rural Malawi and Côte
d’Ivoire, respectively. Although these papers use slightly different identifying assumptions, both
papers are very similar in their conclusions for poverty, in that, they find that standard poverty
indices underestimate child poverty and overestimate poverty among adults. The findings of
this study indicate that the results of DLP and BDK may not be completely generalizable to
other sub-Saharan African countries.
Our results show that fathers have the highest bargaining power in the household as they
command the largest share of household expenditures. Although mothers command a smaller
share of household resources, they tend to bear a higher proportion of the cost of children,
especially very young children. This result is in line with the findings of Duflo (2003) and
Duflo and Udry (2004), who show that an increase in a woman’s income leads to increased
expenditure on goods which favour children, such as education and health care, in South Africa
and Côte d’Ivoire, respectively. Compared to DLP and BDK, children in Ghana command a
relatively large share of total household resources, beginning at 29% for one-child households
and reaching 43% for households with four children. Additionally, this study shows that, on
average, the resource share of mothers is approximately 10 percentage points lower than those
of fathers and children. This is also in contrast to DLP and BDK, who find that children receive
the lowest share of household resources on average.
With regard to poverty, there are a lot more households with poor women and children
than there are with poor men. Assuming equal resource shares within households understates
the incidence of poverty in Ghana, except for men who have two or more children. The results
also show that the incidence of child poverty rises as the number of children in the household
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increases. On average, per-capita calculations yield a poverty rate of 18% for the entire sample
while unequal resource shares yield poverty rates of 15% for fathers, 34% for mothers and 31%
for children. Unlike DLP and BDK, women and not children tend to have the highest poverty
rates in Ghana. Lastly, we illustrate the importance of this kind of study for development
policies by discussing the implications of the results for the Livelihood Empowerment Against
Poverty (LEAP) programme in Ghana, a social cash transfer scheme that is aimed at alleviating
extreme poverty in Ghana.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a survey of the literature
on collective models and gives a brief overview of the DLP model. Section 2.3 describes the data
set by providing summary statistics, and discusses the specification of the model we estimate.
Section 2.4 presents the main results of the study. Section 2.5 discusses the implications of the
main findings for LEAP and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
This section presents the theoretical framework on which the empirical analysis is based.
The first part of the section provides a brief survey of the literature on collective household
models and the second part gives a more detailed overview of the DLP framework we apply in
this chapter and the next.
2.2.1 The Collective Household Model
The collective household model is currently the most popular framework for modelling
household decision making. It was first developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps and
Rees (1988) following the rejection of many of the predictions of the unitary model.1 Chiappori
(1988) generalized the work of Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981)
who modelled household decision-making processes using tools from cooperative game theory.
Collective household models recognize that the household is made up of different individuals,
1See Alderman et al. (1995) and Doss (1996) for a detailed discussion on the rejection of the predictions of
the unitary model.
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each characterized by his or her own preferences. They also assume that these individuals
collectively take Pareto-efficient decisions. A number of studies such as Bourguignon et al.
(1993), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) and Bourguignon et al.
(2009) have since further elaborated the model.
In earlier applications of the collective model, a series of papers show how changes in
distribution factors help to identify changes in resource shares but not the actual levels of
resource shares (see Chiappori and Ekeland, 2009 for a formal proof of this). Browning et al.
(1994), Chiappori et al. (2002) and Vermeulen (2002) are examples of such papers. Distribution
factors are observed socio-demographic factors that affect the sharing rule within the household
but not the preferences of household members or the household’s budget constraint. Although
they are still used in the literature, it can be difficult to test the validity of some commonly
used distribution factors such as relative wage and relative age.
Fortunately, recent variants of the collective model not only identify the levels of resource
shares, but also do not require distribution factors in the identification process. For instance,
Cherchye et al. (2011) and Cherchye et al. (2015) identify resource shares by applying revealed
preference theory. The more popular approach, pioneered by Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel
(2013) (BCL hereafter), identifies resource shares by imposing additional restrictions on the
individual preferences of household members and also allows for general forms of scale economies
to consumption. In particular, BCL imposes the identifying assumption that childless couples
generally have the same preferences for goods as their single counterparts. This allows for
the identification of resource shares since the demand functions of single men and women can
be observed directly from households consisting of only one individual. However, the BCL
model is very complex and difficult to estimate because it does not assume any structure for its
parameters. Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) simplify the BCL model by imposing an additional
restriction that provides some structure on some parts of the model. This allows for the
identification of resource shares from Engel curves (demand curves keeping prices constant)
rather than the complex non-linear system that BCL use. Bargain et al. (2010), Bargain and
Donni (2012) and BDK further extend the BCL model to identify the resource shares of children.
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The DLP model is also an extension of BCL. This model currently offers the most attractive
model for the study of intra-household resource distribution because, compared to other BCL-
type models, it imposes relatively milder assumptions on individual preferences, has lower
data requirements and is easier to implement empirically. DLP identifies resource shares by
making two identifying assumptions. First, resource shares are assumed to be independent of
household expenditure. Second, the DLP model imposes at least one of two semi-parametric
restrictions on the shape of Engel curves. The SAP (Similar Across People) restriction assumes
that in certain limited ways, the preferences of individuals within households with a particular
number of children are similar. This would imply that individuals in one-child households for
instance, have similar tastes. The SAT (Similar Across Types) restriction, on the other hand,
assumes that the preferences of individuals are similar across household types so that fathers
for example, have similar preferences irrespective of the number of children they have. Hence,
unlike the other BCL-type models, the DLP model does not impose that fathers and mothers
have the same tastes as single men, single women, and childless couples, and therefore does not
require data on these household types. Also, the DLP model imposes these restrictions only
on the Engel curves of a set of private assignable goods. This is also in contrast to the other
BCL-type models which impose their identifying restrictions on all goods.
2.2.2 The DLP Framework
As already indicated, the DLP model allows for parents’ bargaining and the joint
consumption of goods that gives rise to economies of scale. Let the subscripts t and s
represent individual and household types, respectively. In this application of the DLP model,
four household types are investigated. Household types are determined by the size of the
household; s = 1, 2, 3, 4 indexes couples with one, two, three, and four children, respectively.
Each household consists of three individual types: an adult male or father denoted by t = m,
an adult female or mother denoted by t = f and children denoted by t = c. Good types
are denoted by the superscript k = 1, ..., K. A household of type s purchases the vector of
quantities of goods zs = (z1s , ..., zKs ) at market prices p = (p1, ..., pK), while each household
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member consumes xt = (x1t , ..., xKt ), the vector of private good equivalents of zs. Let y denote
total household expenditure. Demographic variables such as age and education are suppressed
in this section to simplify notation. They are defined explicitly in the following section where
they are allowed to affect preference parameters and resource shares.
DLP assume economies of scale of a linear technology type where xm +xf +xc = x = A−1s zs.
As is a K by K matrix which converts zs into x, a vector of private good equivalents where
∑
xt
is strictly larger than zs when goods are shared (Gorman, 1976). In this model, the existence
of private assignable goods for each individual type is crucial to the identification of resource
shares. A private assignable good is a good which is consumed only by a particular household
member that is known to the researcher from the data. In other words, these goods do not
have any scale economies in consumption. It is important to emphasise that even though the
DLP model and other BCL-type models are based on a particular private assignable good, the
model estimates overall individual shares of total household expenditure for all goods.
In this study, men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing and footwear are used as the private
assignable goods because expenditures on these goods are observed separately in GLSS 6.
Even though expenditure on clothing and footwear make up only about 6% of total household
expenditure, Bargain et al. (2018) show that clothing and footwear perform best when compared
to other available private assignable goods in estimating actual individual resource shares. This
is because these particular goods (clothing and footwear) validate the individual preference
restrictions that BCL-type models impose, especially SAT. They exploit a unique data set
from Bangladesh that provides data on clothing and footwear, nutrition, health, education,
and other personal effects at the individual level.
Each individual possesses a utility function denoted by Ut(xt) that is monotonically
increasing, strictly quasi-concave, continuous, and twice differentiable. In principle, an
individual’s utility function may depend on the utilities of other members of the household.
However, to simplify the model, we will assume that each individual’s total utility is weakly
separable over the sub-utility functions for goods. Also, due to data limitations, children are
characterized by a single utility function. The identification of resource shares for each child is
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possible only if each child can be assigned a different private assignable good. Unfortunately,
this is not possible from the GLSS 6.
Pareto efficiency implies the following maximization problem for the household:
max
xm,xf ,xc,zs
Ũs[Um(xm), Uf (xf ), Uc(xc), p/y] such that
zs = As[xm + xf + xc], y = z′sp (2.1)
where Ũs represents a monotonically increasing social welfare function. According to BCL,
Equation (2.1) can also be interpreted as a two-stage process. In the first stage, total
expenditure is allocated to household members according to resource shares. Each individual
then maximizes his/her utility subject to his/her shadow budget constraint in the second stage.
A shadow budget constraint in this context is an individual budget constraint that has been
adjusted for both the individual’s resource share and economies of scale. Economies of scale are
characterized by the household shadow prices A′p, which differ from market prices for goods
which are shared. Heating and furniture are common examples of such goods. Unlike resource
shares, the same shadow prices are faced by all household members. Solving Equation (2.1)
above yields the resource shares or Pareto weights for each member of the family.2 Let ηts
denote the resource share of individual t in household type s.
The household demand functions for private assignable goods derived from solving Equation
(2.1) have the following simple forms:
Wms(y, p) = ηms(y, p) wm(ηms(y, p)y, A′sp)
Wfs(y, p) = ηfs(y, p) wf (ηfs(y, p)y, A′sp) (2.2)
Wcs(y, p) = sηcs(y, p) wc(ηcs(y, p)y, A′sp)
whereWts represents the household budget share of individual t’s private assignable good and wt
represents individual t’s budget share of his private assignable good from his own maximization
process (in the second stage). Equation (2.2) defines the household budget share of individual
2Browning et al. (2013) provide a detailed discussion on the relationship between resource shares and Pareto
weights.
13
t’s private assignable good as the product of his individual budget share and his resource share.
However, ηts cannot be identified from Equation (2.2) because even though Wts is observed, wt
is not; and unlike BCL, DLP does not identify wt from single households.
As mentioned previously, DLP circumvents this problem by making two identifying
restrictions. First, resource shares ηts are assumed to be independent of household expenditures
y. Although this can be a strong assumption, studies such as Menon et al. (2012) and Cherchye
et al. (2012) find that this assumption holds in Italian and Dutch data, respectively. Moreover,
resource shares are allowed to depend on variables that are closely related to household
expenditures such as income or wealth. This restriction allows us to rewrite the model so
far in an Engel-curve framework where prices are taken to be constant (Lewbel and Pendakur,
2008). Equation (2.2) can be rewritten in Engel-curve form as
Wms(y) = ηms wms(ηmsy)
Wfs(y) = ηfs wfs(ηfsy) (2.3)
Wcs(y) = sηcs wcs(ηcsy).
The next step is to invoke either the SAP restriction or SAT restriction on the individual
Engel curves for private assignable goods. These semi-parametric restrictions allow for the
identification of resource shares across household types (SAT) or across people within a
household (SAP). It is also possible to invoke both restrictions simultaneously. Assuming
PIGLOG preferences (Muellbauer, 1976) for household members, the model takes the following
form:
Wms(y) = ηms(δms + βms ln ηms) + ηms βms ln y
Wfs(y) = ηfs(δfs + βfs ln ηfs) + ηfs βfs ln y (2.4)
Wcs(y) = sηcs(δcs + βcs ln ηcs) + sηcs βcs ln y
for t = m, f, c and s = 1, 2, 3, 4.3 While δts represents the intercept preference parameters, βts
3Utility functions of the Price Independent Generalized Linearity (PIGL) form assume that expenditure
is independent of prices but dependent on the distribution of expenditure. The logarithmic form of PIGL
preferences, known as PIGLOG preferences, allow Engel curves to be linear in ln(y) as in Equation (2.4). The
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) is an example of a demand system model that is developed using PIGLOG
preferences (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).
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represents the latent slope preference parameters. βts is specified according to which restriction
is applied to the shapes of the Engel curves. If SAP is imposed, βts = βs for all t. If SAT is
imposed, βts = βt for all s. If both SAP and SAT are imposed, βts = β for all t and s. After
imposing these restrictions, resource shares (ηts) of household members can be identified by
observing how household expenditures on each member’s private assignable good (Wts) vary
with total household expenditure (y).4
In appendix 2.A, we carry out tests to confirm that the assumptions necessary for the
identification of resource shares discussed in this section, hold in our data set. In spite of data
restrictions, the results show that these assumptions largely hold in our data set.
2.3 Empirical Implementation
The first part of this section briefly describes the data set and presents sample summary
statistics. The second part discusses the empirical specification of the model and the method
of estimation.
2.3.1 Data and Sample Selection
The Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 6 (GLSS 6) is the most recent round of
the largest nationally representative household survey for the country. It was undertaken
by the Ghana Statistical Service with support from the United Kingdom’s Department
for International Development (DFID), United Nations International Children’s Emergency
Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), International Labour
Organization (ILO), and the World Bank. This survey covers a period of 12 months, from
18th October 2012 to 17th October 2013. The general aim of the survey is to generate data on
the living conditions of Ghanaians. Using questionnaires, well-trained personnel interviewed
households on their general demographic characteristics, education, health, employment, time
use, housing conditions, migration, agriculture, household expenditure, income, and assets.
4See the online appendix of DLP for a more detailed discussion on the identification of resource shares using
this model at http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.438.
15
To ensure that a nationally representative sample was chosen, a two-stage stratified sampling
process was used. In the first stage, 1,200 enumeration areas were selected to form primary
sampling units. The second stage consisted of systematically selecting 15 households in
each primary sampling unit. Out of the 18,000 households selected, 16,772 were successfully
enumerated.
Considering the private assignable goods available from the data set, the sample in this
study is restricted to monogamous, nuclear households. We exclude households consisting of
children older than 14 and/or retired adults to ensure that only one adult of each gender lives in
the household. We exclude households with economically inactive male heads as well. Female-
headed households and single-parent households are also excluded from the sample as this study
investigates gender asymmetry in consumption within the household. Finally, other obvious
outlying observations such as households with zero food expenditure are also excluded. The
final sample is made up of 2,782 households (11,806 individuals) consisting of couples with 1 to 4
children all under the age of 15. Hence, our results hold for this sample of nuclear monogamous
households and may not hold entirely for the other household types that are excluded from the
sample.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of the sample by household size. Generally, the
summary statistics conform to what one would expect from a developing country like Ghana.
Also, the variables have very little variation as the standard deviations are generally small.
First, the men in the sample are generally older than the women. Indeed, a document on
marriage patterns by the United Nations (2000) shows that men in sub-Saharan Africa generally
marry younger women. We also observe that men are more likely than women to have some
education. In addition, the probability of being an uneducated adult increases the more children
the adult has. Most women in the sample are economically active and the percentage of working
women increases as the household size gets larger. 11% of the children in the sample work.
This is disturbing because the average age of a child in this sample is 5. It seems that children
from larger families are more likely to work than children from smaller families. Also, almost
60% of the sample live in rural areas. We notice that larger households are more likely to be
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Sample by Household Size
Couples with All
1 child 2 children 3 children 4 children
General Characteristics
Men’s age 33.3 35.5 37.6 39.1 35.9
(0.29) (0.25) (0.27) (0.33) (0.15)
Women’s age 27.5 29.6 31.4 32.6 29.9
(0.26) (0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.13)
Men’s schooling dummy 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.68 0.78
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Women’s schooling dummy 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.58 0.68
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Working women dummy 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.88
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Working children dummy 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.11
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003)
Proportion of male children 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Average age of children 3.1 4.6 5.8 6.4 5.2
(0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05)
Rural household dummy 0.54 0.59 0.61 0.70 0.59
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Per-capita expenditure 2.51 1.98 1.72 1.48 2.04
per day in USD∗
Budget Shares
Food 0.523 0.530 0.539 0.552 0.533
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003)
Housing 0.071 0.065 0.062 0.051 0.064
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Transportation 0.064 0.059 0.057 0.049 0.059
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Men’s clothing and footwear 0.031 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.027
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Women’s clothing and footwear 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Children’s clothing and footwear 0.013 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.017
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Sample size 786 900 728 368 2,782
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
∗The exchange rate used is $1= 2.895 GHS (Source: Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook)
poor; expenditure per capita per day falls as the household becomes larger.
With regard to budget shares, most households spend more than half of total expenditure
on food. Apart from food, the highest proportions of household expenditure are spent on
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housing and transportation. It is important to note that for a typical private good such as
food, budget shares rise as the household size increases. On the other hand, with items such
as housing and transportation which are considered public, budget shares fall as the household
size becomes larger. This indicates that economies of scale to consumption are likely to exist
in the sample and may differ for each good. The budget shares of the private assignable goods
are most important for our purposes. As expected, Table 2.1 shows that the budget shares
of both men’s and women’s clothing and footwear reduce as the number of children increases
as children are known to impose economic costs on parents (Bargain et al., 2010; Bargain and
Donni, 2012). Interestingly, the budget share on children’s clothing and footwear increases as
the household becomes larger but at a decreasing rate. Again, this could indicate the presence
of scale economies in consumption among children. Unfortunately, our model is unable to
account for this because of data restrictions.
2.3.2 Model Specification and Estimation Method
Like DLP, we estimate the log-linear Engel curves for private assignable goods in Equation
(2.4) using non-linear seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to allow for the correlation of errors
across equations. The estimators are iterated and the regressors are taken to be exogenous.
The data set allows for the construction of 18 socio-demographic factors. These demographic
variables are allowed to affect both resource shares and tastes of household members and hence
cannot be classified as distribution factors. As previously indicated, the DLP model does
not require distribution factors for the identification of resource shares. These demographic
variables include the ecological region of residence (coastal, forest, savannah, and the Greater
Accra Metropolitan Area as the reference variable), dummies indicating an older than average
father and mother, the education levels of father and mother, the average age of children in the
household minus five, the number of children in the household less than three years old, the
proportion of children who are boys, a dummy indicating whether the household owns land, a
dummy indicating whether the mother works, a dummy indicating whether at least one child
works, a dummy indicating whether the household lives in a rural area, and dummy variables
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indicating the religion of the father (Christian or Muslim, with other religions as the reference
variable).
Let d = (d1, d2, ..., d18) be a vector of these demographic variables and let b = (b1, ..., b4) be
a vector of four dummy variables, each indicating a household type s. The vector b generally
plays the role of the constant for each household type in ηts, δts, and βts. ηts and δts are
specified as linear in b and d for a total of 22 coefficients each. As already mentioned, βts is
specified according to the semi-parametric restriction imposed on the Engel curves. For SAP,
βts is specified as linear in b and d for a total of 22 coefficients. For SAT, βts is specified as
linear in a constant and d for each of the 3 individual types for a total of 57 coefficients. When
both SAP and SAT are imposed, βts is specified as linear in a constant and d for a total of 19
coefficients.
2.4 Empirical Results
In this section, the key findings of the study are presented. The section is divided into 3
parts. The first part presents estimated resource shares for reference households. We check for
possible endogeneity in the second part and carry out a poverty analysis based on estimated
resource shares in the third part.
2.4.1 Resource Share Estimates
Table 2.2 presents the estimates of resource shares using each of the three identifying
assumptions: SAP, SAT, and the combination of the two. This table lists resource shares
for mothers, fathers, children and each child in a reference household and the marginal effects
of a number of demographic variables on these estimates (see Table 2.B.1 in the appendix for
the marginal effects of all demographic variables on resource shares). A reference household is
one where all demographic variables take the value of zero. For this essay, a reference household
is an urban household living in the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area. Both parents have the
modal level of education, which is high school education, and all children are girls and have
an average age of 5. The reference household does not own land and neither the mother nor
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children work.
Table 2.2: Resource Share Estimates for Ghanaian Households
SAP SAT SAP and SAT
Household Individual
characteristic type Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr
One child man 0.366∗∗∗ 0.059 0.339∗∗∗ 0.073 0.351∗∗∗ 0.057
woman 0.292∗∗∗ 0.041 0.324∗∗∗ 0.082 0.294∗∗∗ 0.041
children 0.342∗∗∗ 0.048 0.337∗∗∗ 0.058 0.355∗∗∗ 0.048
each child 0.342∗∗∗ 0.048 0.337∗∗∗ 0.058 0.355∗∗∗ 0.048
Two children man 0.424∗∗∗ 0.064 0.394∗∗∗ 0.076 0.409∗∗∗ 0.061
woman 0.191∗∗∗ 0.040 0.243∗∗∗ 0.070 0.198∗∗∗ 0.041
children 0.385∗∗∗ 0.051 0.363∗∗∗ 0.060 0.393∗∗∗ 0.051
each child 0.193∗∗∗ 0.026 0.182∗∗∗ 0.030 0.196∗∗∗ 0.025
Three children man 0.370∗∗∗ 0.064 0.349∗∗∗ 0.075 0.345∗∗∗ 0.062
woman 0.201∗∗∗ 0.040 0.229∗∗∗ 0.066 0.204∗∗∗ 0.041
children 0.428∗∗∗ 0.053 0.423∗∗∗ 0.062 0.451∗∗∗ 0.052
each child 0.143∗∗∗ 0.018 0.141∗∗∗ 0.021 0.151∗∗∗ 0.017
Four children man 0.344∗∗∗ 0.070 0.315∗∗∗ 0.078 0.334∗∗∗ 0.068
woman 0.191∗∗∗ 0.045 0.220∗∗∗ 0.064 0.201∗∗∗ 0.045
children 0.465∗∗∗ 0.061 0.466∗∗∗ 0.066 0.465∗∗∗ 0.059
each child 0.116∗∗∗ 0.015 0.116∗∗∗ 0.017 0.116∗∗∗ 0.015
Rural man 0.023 0.022 0.037 0.024 0.022 0.022
household woman 0.041∗∗ 0.016 0.010 0.014 0.040∗∗ 0.017
children -0.064∗∗∗ 0.022 -0.047∗ 0.026 -0.061∗∗∗ 0.022
Working man 0.075∗∗ 0.031 0.034 0.033 0.077∗∗ 0.031
children woman -0.005 0.021 0.025 0.023 -0.005 0.021
children -0.070∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.059 0.036 -0.072∗∗∗ 0.026
Number of man 0.035 0.023 0.013 0.024 0.033 0.023
children<3yrs woman -0.046∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.035∗∗ 0.016 -0.047∗∗∗ 0.015
children 0.010 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.014 0.020
Man’s man -0.002 0.007 0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.007
education woman 0.012∗∗ 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.012∗∗ 0.006
children -0.010 0.006 -0.006 0.008 -0.009 0.006
Woman’s man -0.019∗∗ 0.007 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.009 -0.019∗∗ 0.008
education woman 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005
children 0.018∗∗∗ 0.007 0.025∗∗∗ 0.009 0.018∗∗∗ 0.007
Proportion of man 0.095∗∗∗ 0.025 0.082∗∗∗ 0.024 0.098∗∗∗ 0.025
male children woman -0.043∗∗ 0.020 -0.048∗∗ 0.019 -0.045∗∗ 0.020
children -0.052∗∗∗ 0.021 -0.033 0.029 -0.053∗∗∗ 0.022
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We will focus on the rightmost columns of the table which present the estimates when
both SAP and SAT are imposed. For the most part, these estimates are the most precise
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because more identifying assumptions are invoked than with either SAP or SAT alone. Actually,
the estimates and standard errors for the SAP restriction only and the combination of both
restrictions are quite similar. This may be an indication that the SAT assumption is weak
and hence, does not cause significant changes to SAP estimates and standard errors when both
restrictions are imposed. DLP acknowledge the fragility of the SAT restriction and admit that
one may need a large sample to obtain precise estimates when imposing this restriction only.
Nonetheless, the results are reasonably consistent across all three identifying assumptions.
The first four rows of Table 2.2 present the constant terms in the ηts functions which
correspond to the resource shares in reference households. We notice that although fathers
command a significantly larger share of household resources than mothers, mothers bear a
higher proportion of the cost of children. For example, a mother’s share falls by about 9
percentage points while that of a father rises by about 6 percentage points when they have a
second child. In fact, at 5% significance level, the hypothesis that the father’s share is invariant
to the number of children in the household cannot be rejected. Children command 35.5% of
household resources in one-child households. This is relatively large in comparison to DLP
who find that children in one-child households command 23% of household resources. The
results of BDK also show that an only child in Côte d’Ivoire commands just 19% of household
resources in their baseline model. We additionally notice the per-capita resource share of each
child reducing as the number of children increase. Each child in a household with four children
is estimated to command 11.6% of the resources available. This appears to be a substantial
amount if children jointly consume goods like toys and books.
Let us now turn to the marginal effects of demographic variables on resource shares. We will
focus on six covariates that stand out. First, children’s resource shares reduce by 6 percentage
points in rural areas. Although children’s resource shares may still be considered high even
when reduced by 6 percentage points, this result suggests that child poverty in Ghana is more
of a rural phenomenon than an urban one. Still on the subject of children, the coefficients
corresponding to the working children dummy reveal that resource shares of children in these
households are reduced by 7.2 percentage points. The resource shares of mothers with working
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children also reduce marginally while fathers gain the extra resources. This shows that, in
terms of consumption, child labour may not benefit the children themselves but benefits parents
(especially fathers) instead. It may also indicate that households that put a lower weight on
children’s welfare are more likely to require them to work.
Mothers also tend to command less resources if their children are younger than three years.
To be precise, a mother commands 4.7 percentage points less resources, while fathers and
children gain. Because infants under three years are not likely to have started school yet,
mothers who work in the informal sector or as family labourers may be forced to stay home
temporarily to take care of the children. In doing this, they lose a major source of their income
and livelihood, leading to a reduction in their bargaining power in the household. This is in
line with the findings of Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) and Couprie (2007) for Canada and the
United Kingdom, respectively, showing that a woman’s income share or relative wage is directly
related to the share of household resources she commands.
The next two covariates of interest relate to the education levels of parents in the household.
The more educated a father is, the higher the resource share of his spouse. The resource shares
of women with more educated husbands are 1.2 percentage points higher. However, these extra
resources seem to be mostly diverted from the children and not from the father. On the other
hand, a more educated mother diverts resources from her husband to her children. Her own
share increases only by negligible amounts. Children with more educated mothers have their
resource shares increasing roughly by 2 percentage points. In sum, although a more educated
father seems beneficial to a woman in terms of resource shares, the children are negatively
affected. On the contrary, a more educated mother is advantageous mainly to the children of
the household. Again, this conforms to the idea that mothers are more willing than fathers to
sacrifice for their children in terms of their expenditure patterns.
Finally, similar to DLP and Rose (1999), this study finds compelling evidence of gender
bias in Ghanaian households, but, unlike these other papers, we find gender bias in favour of
girls and not boys. Furthermore, this result is robust to changes in the specification of the
non-linear SUR model we estimate. In particular, we find that resources are diverted from
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children as the proportion of boys in the household increases; children’s resource shares are
about 5 percentage points lower if all the children in the household are boys. A possible reason
for this is the matrilineal system practised by the Akan ethnic group. The Akan ethnic group
is the largest in the country; according to the main report for GLSS 6, 50% of household
heads in the country are Akan (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014a). Akans practise a matrilineal
system of descent, succession and inheritance. Hence, the girl child is preferred to the boy child
because women are traditionally viewed as the maintainers of the lineage or clan (Adei, 2003).
This contrasts with the tradition in Eastern and Southern Asia for instance, where the boy
child is preferred because of a patrilineal system of inheritance (Das Gupta et al., 2003). In a
matrilineal system, the external family takes precedence over the nuclear family and conjugal
ties are usually weak since husband and wife belong to two different families. Additionally,
children in Akan households do not belong to their father’s family but to their mother’s family.
Therefore, matrilineal uncles may exert a greater authority than fathers on the children since
male children inherit the wealth of their matrilineal uncles. In the same way, fathers are likely
to spend more on their sisters’ children than on their own children especially if all his children
are male. Nevertheless, an Akan father is still expected to set his children up for life by giving
them an education or by teaching them a trade (Takyi and Gyimah, 2007; La Ferrara and
Milazzo, 2014). It is important to note that BDK also find some evidence of gender bias in
favour of girls in Côte d’Ivoire, although insignificant in their case. This is interesting because
Côte d’Ivoire is located next to Ghana and 30% of its population is also Akan.5
We investigate this bias further by applying the same non-linear SUR model to two groups
of sub-samples. The first group compares results from a sub-sample of Akan households to
that of non-Akan households while the second group compares results from the four ecological
zones. Table 2.3 presents the coefficients of the proportion of boys variable for each sub-sample
and for each of the three identifying assumptions. Again, we will focus on the results obtained
when both SAP and SAT are invoked (the last two columns). The first row presents the
coefficients for the total sample, which is the same as row 8 of Table 2.2. The next two rows
5For a detailed discussion on the matrilineal system of the Akan ethnic group, see Warren (1986); Rattray
(1923, 1927); Nkansa-Kyeremateng (1996); Fortes (1960).
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Table 2.3: Gender Bias Estimates in Ghanaian Households
SAP SAT SAP and SAT
Ecological Individual
zone type Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr
All households man 0.095∗∗∗ 0.025 0.082∗∗∗ 0.024 0.098∗∗∗ 0.025
(2,874 hhs) woman -0.043∗∗ 0.020 -0.048∗∗ 0.019 -0.045∗∗ 0.020
children -0.052∗∗∗ 0.021 -0.033 0.029 -0.053∗∗∗ 0.022
Akan man -0.115∗∗∗ 0.024 -0.075 0.064 -0.118∗∗∗ 0.031
(944 hhs) woman 0.163∗∗∗ 0.032 0.074 0.064 0.052∗∗ 0.024
children -0.048∗ 0.028 0.001 0.003 0.066∗ 0.036
Non-Akan man 0.152∗∗∗ 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.146∗∗∗ 0.030
(1,838 hhs) woman -0.080∗∗∗ 0.021 0.010 0.034 -0.077∗∗∗ 0.021
children -0.072∗∗∗ 0.023 -0.010 0.034 -0.069∗∗∗ 0.024
Forest man 0.076∗∗ 0.031 0.079 - -0.013 0.025
(1,196 hhs) woman -0.076∗∗ 0.031 0.000 - 0.073∗∗ 0.034
children 0.000 0.000 -0.078 - -0.060 0.037
Coastal man 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(327 hhs) woman 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
children 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Savannah man -0.155∗∗∗ 0.037 -0.081∗ 0.046 -0.160∗∗∗ 0.037
(974 hhs) woman 0.210∗∗∗ 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.208∗∗∗ 0.031
children -0.056∗ 0.030 0.081∗ 0.046 -0.047 0.031
GAMA man 0.003 0.006 0.021 0.017 - -
(285 hhs) woman 0.000 0.000 -0.061∗∗∗ 0.022 - -
children -0.003 0.006 0.040 0.028 - -
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
present the estimates for Akan households versus non-Akan households. We define an Akan
household as one where both adults in the household identify first as belonging to the Akan
ethnic group. They could also belong to a second ethnic group if either of their parents is not
Akan. Surprisingly, we find the resource share of children increasing by 6.6 percentage points
in Akan households and reducing by almost 7 percentage points in non-Akan households if all
children are boys. This clearly contradicts what one would expect if Akans truly practise a
matrilineal system of inheritance. However, due to modernisation and the rising number of
inter-ethnic marriages in Ghana, it is possible (especially in urban areas) that, the traditional
matrilineal system is not fully adhered to in these households that identify as Akan (Awusabo-
Asare, 1990).
Another plausible way to capture matriliny in Ghana is through the four ecological zones
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of the country namely: forest, coastal, savannah and the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area
(GAMA hereafter). Akans are known to have settled in the forest ecological zone comprising
mainly of the Western, Central, Ashanti, Eastern and Brong-Ahafo regions (Awusabo-Asare,
1990). According to Ghana Statistical Service (2014a), about 70% of the households in these
regions have Akan household heads. We estimate the model separately for each of the ecological
zones. The coefficients for the proportion of boys variable are presented in the fourth to seventh
rows of Table 2.3. As expected, we observe that the bias in favour of girls is greatest in the
forest ecological zone, with the resource shares of children reducing by 6 percentage points, if
all children are male. It is important to note that the coefficient for children for the forest area
is greater in absolute value than the coefficient for the entire sample, as this suggests that the
forest coefficient may be driving the result for the entire sample. The coefficient for children for
the savannah zone also indicates girl-child preference, although this coefficient is not as large as
that of the forest zone or the entire sample. Meanwhile, gender bias appears to be non-existent
in the coastal ecological zone. Due to data restrictions, we are unable to obtain estimates for
GAMA when both SAP and SAT are invoked. However, results from imposing either SAP or
SAT alone does not indicate significant girl-child preference in this area. In sum, we do find
some evidence indicating that the matrilineal system practised in regions that are traditionally
Akan, and not necessarily by parents who identify as Akan, could be one of the main reasons for
girl-child preference in Ghana. Nonetheless, our results in Table 2.3 are generally less precise
than those presented in 2.2 due to the relatively smaller sample sizes. For instance, we are
unable to obtain standard errors for the forest ecological zone when the SAT restriction alone
is invoked.
2.4.2 Handling Endogeneity
The basic DLP model can be adapted to deal with endogeneity through instrumental
variables. In this setting, the two variables that are likely to be endogenous are total expenditure
and the number of children in the household (that is, the household size).
Total expenditure may be endogenous because of measurement error between total
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expenditure and actual consumption. Secondly, endogeneity may also occur because of recall
errors, as households are asked to recall consumption from the past. Following DLP, we
use wealth measures including farm wealth and household wealth as instruments for total
expenditure. Farm wealth is a sum of the value of livestock and farm equipment, and household
wealth is a sum of the value of durable items in a household and the household’s savings. These
variables are less likely to be subject to recall errors as most of these items can be directly
observed and counted by interviewers. Farm wealth is more suited to rural households while
household wealth is more suited to urban households.
The number of children in the household could also be an endogenous variable because
unobserved heterogeneity in the error term of clothing equations may affect fertility decisions.
Following DLP, we are able to construct three instruments relating to health and education
from the data set that are likely to correlate with fertility decisions but not clothing decisions.
First, we use the number of minutes it takes for children to get to school. Since, basic education
is free in Ghana, parents with more children have more of an incentive to live closer to a basic
school. The second instrument is a dummy indicating whether at least one of the adults in
the household is disabled. The third instrument is a dummy indicating whether the couple
uses condoms as a means of contraception. This variable is chosen because most adults in
Ghana have access to condoms as they are provided free of charge or at very low costs by the
government.
Altogether, these instruments are strongly correlated to total expenditure and yield an
F-statistic of 102.10 on the excluded instruments in the first stage. On the other hand, the
instruments are not strong in predicting the number of children in the household; they yield an
F-statistic of only 2.44. Following DLP, we estimate the model with endogenous variables using
Hansen’s (1982) generalized method of moments (GMM). Unfortunately, the model we estimate
does not converge.6 Nevertheless, we are able to retrieve the estimates of the last iteration of
the GMM estimation and find that the results have the same pattern as the non-linear SUR
results (see Table 2.C.1 in appendix C). This suggests that endogeneity is not likely to be a
6This is not a rare occurrence as most studies are unable to construct strong instruments from available
data. Tommasi and Wolf (2016), for example, deal with a similar case of non-convergence in an attempt to
control for endogeneity.
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significant issue for our model.
2.4.3 Poverty Analysis
Estimating the level of resource shares alone does not tell us whether the needs of an
individual are met. In order to gain an understanding into the level of welfare of individual
household members, we calculate individual poverty rates based on estimated resource shares
and compare these to standard poverty measures.
To begin, columns 3 to 6 of Table 2.4 present the mean, standard deviation, and the
maximum and the minimum values of resource shares for individuals across different household
types. These calculations are based on the estimates obtained when both SAP and SAT
identifying assumptions are imposed (the rightmost columns of Table 2.2) and average over
all the values of demographic factors. These descriptive statistics (especially the mean values)
present a more general picture of how resource shares change across household types. Generally,
mean values of resource shares follow the expected pattern. The average resource shares of
fathers are higher than that of mothers for all household types. Indeed, in the penultimate row
of the table, which shows average resource shares when all household types are combined, we
notice that women’s average resource shares are at least 10 percentage points lower than the
average resource shares for fathers and children. We also observe that standard deviations are
consistently lower for women than men and children across all household types. According to
DLP, this may suggest that for mothers, the various demographic variables are not as important
as the household size in determining the level of resource shares. In other words, women who
live in a particular household type tend to have similar socio-demographic characteristics. Also,
it is reassuring to see that all minimum and maximum values of resource shares lie between 0
and 1.
The last two columns of Table 2.4 present estimated poverty rates across household types
for our sample. Column 7 presents individual poverty rates based on the resource shares
estimated in this study and column 8, standard poverty rates which assume equal resource
shares. We use the poverty threshold calculated by the Ghana Statistical Service using data
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Table 2.4: Average Resource Shares and Poverty Rates
Resource Shares Poverty Rates
Using Using
Household Individual Standard unequal equal
type type Mean deviation Minimum Maximum shares shares
One child man 0.369 0.096 0.075 0.630 0.181 0.090
woman 0.341 0.055 0.154 0.507 0.205
children 0.290 0.081 0.067 0.567 0.146
each child 0.290 0.081 0.067 0.567
Two children man 0.415 0.093 0.167 0.666 0.116 0.166
woman 0.233 0.052 0.073 0.383 0.413
children 0.352 0.078 0.135 0.580 0.320
each child 0.176 0.039 0.068 0.290
Three children man 0.347 0.096 0.088 0.623 0.148 0.223
woman 0.236 0.057 0.066 0.383 0.350
children 0.416 0.078 0.149 0.641 0.359
each child 0.139 0.026 0.050 0.214
Four children man 0.342 0.091 0.106 0.652 0.171 0.326
woman 0.224 0.054 0.079 0.377 0.397
children 0.434 0.073 0.255 0.607 0.500
each child 0.108 0.018 0.064 0.152
All households man 0.375 0.099 0.075 0.666 0.150 0.180
woman 0.263 0.073 0.066 0.507 0.336
children 0.362 0.095 0.067 0.641 0.305
each child 0.189 0.084 0.050 0.567
All persons all 0.236 0.117 0.050 0.666 0.302 0.198
from GLSS 6.7 According to Ghana Statistical Service (2014b), an adult needs GHS1,314.00
a year to purchase essential food and non-food commodities. Since children have lower needs
than adults, we follow the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
and estimate that children’s needs are 60% of that of an adult. Hence, we compare expenditure
on children to GHS788.40 in assessing the incidence of child poverty.
With regard to poverty estimates, there are a number of patterns to take note of. First,
it is clear from column 7 that the poverty incidence is much higher for women and children
than for men. While women have the highest incidence of poverty in households with one
to two children, children have the highest poverty rates in households with four children. In
households with three children, poverty rates are roughly the same for mothers and children.
7We also estimate individual poverty rates using the World Bank threshold of $3.10 per person a day (at
2011 purchasing power parity prices) and arrive at the same conclusions.
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In addition to this, the incidence of poverty for children rises consistently with household size.
As BDK argues, one reason for this may be the fact that we are unable to account for the large
economies of scale to consumption that may exist amongst the children of a household. The
figures in the penultimate row of column 7 present the estimates of individual poverty rates for
all households in the sample. These figures suggest that mothers particularly and children are
the most vulnerable groups to poverty in Ghana. Mothers and children have poverty rates of
33.6% and 30.5%, respectively, while fathers have a poverty rate of 15%. From our results in
Table 2.2 and our discussions in Subsection 2.4.1, we can conclude that one of the main reasons
women tend to be the poorest is that they tend to bear most of the cost of having young
children. In other words, poverty among mothers in Ghana seems to be directly related to the
welfare of their children, especially the young ones. DLP and BDK do not find this relationship
in their studies. Also, these other studies find that per-capita calculations overestimate poverty
levels for mothers and fathers, but underestimate poverty levels for children. Our results, on
the other hand, indicate that the only instances where per-capita calculations overestimate
poverty levels are for men who have two or more children. For the most part, the incidence of
poverty in Ghana is generally underestimated when equal resource shares are assumed.
In sum, our findings show that the nature of poverty may vary from country to country in
the sub-Saharan African region. More importantly, they show that the study of intra-household
resource allocation can be a useful tool for understanding these differences. Knowledge gained
from this kind of study has several applications in the targeting and implementation of poverty
alleviation policies. In Section 2.5, we discuss the importance of our results for one of such
policies in Ghana.
2.5 Implications for LEAP
The Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme was first implemented
in 2008 as the flagship programme of the National Social Protection Strategy and as part
of the country’s efforts to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).8 The
8For more general information on the LEAP programme, see www.leap.gov.gh.
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programme is funded by the government of Ghana and supported by the World Bank and the
DFID. The objective of the programme is to alleviate extreme poverty in Ghana by increasing
basic household consumption and nutrition, increasing access to health care services, and
increasing school enrolment and attendance among the extremely poor and vulnerable. This is
done primarily through social cash transfers and the provision of health insurance for eligible
households. Currently, LEAP has 213,028 beneficiaries in all 216 districts and all 10 regions
of the country. The scheme targets specific social groups including orphans and vulnerable
children, severely disabled individuals, the elderly who have no support and, recently, pregnant
and lactating women. For the purposes of this section, we will focus on orphans, vulnerable
children, pregnant women, and mothers with infants since our sample does not explicitly include
the other social groups.
In 2015, the LEAP programme was extended to include pregnant women and mothers with
infants under 15 months old. This sub-component of LEAP called LEAP 1000 currently covers
only the Northern and Upper East regions of the country and specifically aims at reducing
stunting in Ghana. According to UNICEF (2013), stunting can have negative long-term effects
on children such as general poor health and diminished cognitive and productive capabilities.
Since most stunting is known to occur before a child turns 2 years old (Walker et al., 2007),
LEAP 1000 hopes to reduce stunting by supporting children for the first 1000 days of their lives.
Based on our results, we know that child poverty is most prevalent in large rural households
making it more likely for children in such households to be stunted. LEAP 1000 is likely to be
an effective means of reducing stunting and child poverty in Ghana because it effectively targets
these households. According to MoGCSP (2016), LEAP 1000 households have 6 members on
average compared to the average of 4.5 in rural Ghana. MoGCSP (2016) also finds that LEAP
1000 households have a poverty rate of 91% and a poverty gap of 54%. These poverty measures
are also much higher than average rates in rural areas in Ghana. Also, as our results have
indicated, the mothers of these poor and vulnerable children are likely to be even poorer and
more vulnerable themselves. Our findings show that mothers with younger children (less than 3
years old) have reduced bargaining power in the household; resource shares for these women can
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be 5 percentage points lower than for other women. This is especially important for LEAP 1000
households as women in these households are either pregnant or have children that are less than
15 months. The Baseline Evaluation Report for the programme released in May 2016 states
that over 80% of the women in LEAP 1000 households did not complete primary education
and live with spouses that exhibit controlling behaviour. In addition, 20% of these women were
married before the age of 18 (MoGCSP, 2016). These factors explain why the women eligible
for this programme are likely to be extremely vulnerable and poor. This means that although
LEAP 1000 is primarily aimed at reducing stunting in children, the programme is likely to
create the positive externality of improving the welfare of some of the most vulnerable women
in the country also. This makes LEAP 1000 a potentially effective poverty alleviation scheme
for the Ghanaian context. Hence, policy makers need to consider expanding this sub-component
of the LEAP programme to cover all the rural regions of the country.
Women can also play an important role in the administration of mainstream LEAP to
improve the overall efficiency of the programme. Currently, any member of a LEAP household
can be nominated to receive payments on behalf of that household. These individuals are known
as caregivers. In the spirit of Duflo (2003), our findings indicate that women are more likely
to spend the cash they receive on the needs of children than men. This is especially important
in Ghana since half of the households in Ghana are matrilineal. This gives mothers an even
greater incentive to spend on the needs of their children. Therefore, encouraging female adults
to be caregivers in households where child beneficiaries are present is likely to greatly improve
the effectiveness of mainstream LEAP.
In order to ensure that the objectives of the programme are achieved, households with
eligible children receive payments only if certain conditions are met with regard to children’s
health and education. In this sense, the scheme is conditional for child beneficiaries. One of the
conditions that must be met is that children in LEAP households cannot be involved in child
trafficking or in the worst forms of child labour. Our results on working children confirm the
importance of this condition. However, our findings indicate that children who are involved in
any kind of work at all can have their resource shares reduced by 7 percentage points. Therefore,
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making this condition a little more stringent than it already is could be a legitimate course of
action.
2.6 Conclusion
Researchers are now able to use collective household models to estimate the proportion of
total expenditure that each member of the household commands in spite of data restrictions
and joint consumption. Estimating resource shares of individuals is particularly important
for developing countries because intra-household inequality is likely to be very high in such
countries.
In the present essay, we apply the Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013) framework to
a Ghanaian data set to estimate resource shares and calculate individual poverty rates. The
results show that fathers command a larger share of resources than mothers and children. One
of the reasons for this appears to be the fact that mothers bear a significantly larger proportion
of the cost of having children, especially when the children are less than three years old. The
resource shares of children are quite large compared to similar papers on sub-Saharan Africa
although per-capita resource shares of children falls with the number of children. We also find
significant gender bias in favour of girls. A likely reason for this is the practice of the matrilineal
system of descent and inheritance within the forest ecological region by the largest ethnic group
in the country. Furthermore, unlike educated fathers, educated mothers tend to divert resources
from their spouses to favour their children. Finally, children who are involved in any form of
work appear to command significantly lower levels of resources in the household. With regard
to poverty, the estimates of individual poverty generally show that women and children are
the most vulnerable groups of people to poverty in Ghana. Standard poverty indices generally
underestimate poverty rates in Ghana except for men who have two or more children.
Finally, to illustrate the applicability of our results to development policies, we discuss
the implications of our findings for the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP)
programme, a social cash transfer programme that is aimed at alleviating extreme poverty
in Ghana. Based on the results, we argue that LEAP 1000 is likely to be very effective at
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reducing poverty among women and children. We also recognize that allowing for only female
caregivers is likely to improve the outcomes of mainstream LEAP. Lastly, we suggest that the
condition that children are not involved in child trafficking or in the worst forms of child labour
is strengthened.
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Appendix 2.A Testing DLP Model Assumptions
Appendix 2.A discusses the tests carried out to confirm that the four assumptions necessary
for the identification of resource shares in the DLP model hold in our data set. The online
appendix of DLP provides a detailed discussion on the derivations of these tests. In carrying
out some of these tests, additional samples on single individuals and childless couples from
GLSS 6 are used. In spite of data restrictions, the results show that the assumptions of the
DLP model largely hold in our data set.
Do households make Pareto-efficient decisions? DLP, like BCL, assumes that
households make decisions in a Pareto-efficient manner and allow for joint consumption among
members of the household. Given PIGLOG preferences and the other assumptions of the DLP
model, Pareto-efficiency has different implications for each of the semi-parametric restrictions
on Engel curves of single households and childless couples. For SAP, Pareto efficiency implies
that the slopes of the Engel curves for men’s clothing and women’s clothing have the same sign.
We test this on 462 childless couples using linear SUR regressions and find that on average,
the sign of the slope coefficient is the same for both men (-0.005) and women (-0.006). From
an observation by observation stance, 75% of the childless couples have the slope coefficients of
the man and woman having the same sign.
For SAT, Pareto-efficiency implies that the slopes of Engel curves for men’s and women’s
clothing among childless couples must be proportional to that of single persons with the sum
of the proportions equalling 1. Again, we test this using linear SUR regressions on 1,643
single households and 462 childless couples. Out of the 13 slope coefficients, the sum of the
proportions for men and women is not statistically different from 1 for 10 of those coefficients.
Taken together, the results for both SAP and SAT suggest that households in our data set
make Pareto-efficient decisions.
Are resource shares affected by household expenditure? As previously indicated, all
BCL-type models impose resource-share invariance to expenditure in order to identify resource
shares. Other studies have shown empirically that this restriction may be valid in some data
sets (see Menon et al., 2012 or Cherchye et al., 2012). To test the validity of this assumption in
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our data set, we re-run the non-linear SUR estimation given both SAP and SAT conditions in
the last columns of Table 2.2 including a new dummy variable in ηts, δts and β that indicates
higher expenditure. This dummy takes the value of 1 when household expenditure is above the
median value for the sample. If resource-share invariance holds, we expect this new variable to
be statistically insignificant in ηts. A Wald test indicates that the coefficient on this variable is
not statistically different from zero with p-values 0.4573 for men’s resource shares and 0.9997 for
women’s resource shares. Therefore, our results show that within our sample, resource shares
are unaffected by household expenditure.
Are SAP and/or SAT valid restrictions on individual preferences? Due to data
restrictions, we are unable to test these assumptions directly on our sample. However, we are
able to test whether SAP holds among single households by comparing the slopes of Engel curves
of single men and single women. Assuming PIGLOG preferences for both men and women,
SAP implies that the slope coefficients for single men and single women are statistically equal.
We estimate separate linear SUR regressions using a sample of 1,161 single men and 482 single
women and carry out a Wald test on the slope parameters. With a p-value of 0.5433, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the slope coefficients for single men and single women
are statistically equal. The fact that SAP holds for single households is reassuring, and shows
that SAP is likely to hold within our sample as well.
We are unable to test the validity of SAT in single households because such a test would
require data from 2 waves of the GLSS. Unfortunately, we do not have access to previous
rounds of the GLSS. Moreover, as previously mentioned, SAT requires relatively large samples
to produce precise results. Compared to GLSS 6, previous rounds of GLSS cover very few
households and hence we are likely to end up with a relatively small sample.
Are clothing and footwear private assignable goods? This restriction can be
violated in two ways: through direct sharing among family members and through consumption
externalities. To test for direct sharing, we re-estimate the non-linear SUR estimation given
both SAP and SAT conditions in the last columns of Table 2.2 treating clothing and footwear
as two separate private assignable goods. This yields a number of overidentifying restrictions.
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Similar to DLP, we argue that footwear is more difficult to share than clothing. Hence, if
clothing is not shared within the household, the estimates of resource shares obtained from
using clothing as the private assignable good should be statistically equal to the estimates
obtained from using footwear. Unexpectedly, the results show some evidence of direct sharing.
However, it is important to note that footwear budget shares are very small (with a mean of
less than 1%). This leads to badly estimated Engel curves for footwear. Indeed, the estimates
obtained from clothing are very similar to those obtained when the sum of clothing and footwear
are used (last columns of Table 2.2). This is not the case with footwear. Hence, clothing and
footwear may not be comparable in this case. Moreover, we can be quite certain that children
do not share clothing and footwear with their parents as our sample excludes households with
older children. The mean age of children in our sample is 5. In view of these considerations,
we do not consider these results to provide overwhelming evidence of direct sharing in the
household. As DLP argues, the previous tests of the other three model assumptions are really
joint tests of those assumptions and the privateness and assignability of clothing and footwear.
If this assumption were not valid in our data set, all the other tests should have failed. Hence,
we can conclude that for our purposes, using clothing and footwear as private assignable goods
does not adversely affect the results.
Externalities in clothing consumption occur if one household member derives utility from
clothing worn by other members of the household. DLP tests for this by comparing estimates
of resource shares for two-parent households and single-mother households. In doing this, they
test the dependence of an adult’s utility on the consumption of clothing by his or her spouse.
Unfortunately, we are unable to carry out this test because of data restrictions.
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Appendix 2.B Estimated Resource Shares - Complete
Table 2.B.1: Resource Share Estimates for Ghanaian Households - Complete
SAP SAT SAP and SAT
Household Individual
characteristic type Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr
One child man 0.366*** 0.059 0.339*** 0.073 0.351*** 0.057
woman 0.292*** 0.041 0.324*** 0.082 0.294*** 0.041
children 0.342*** 0.048 0.337*** 0.058 0.355*** 0.048
each child 0.342*** 0.048 0.337*** 0.058 0.355*** 0.048
Two children man 0.424*** 0.064 0.394*** 0.076 0.409*** 0.061
woman 0.191*** 0.040 0.243*** 0.070 0.198*** 0.041
children 0.385*** 0.051 0.363*** 0.060 0.393*** 0.051
each child 0.193*** 0.026 0.182*** 0.030 0.196*** 0.025
Three children man 0.370*** 0.064 0.349*** 0.075 0.345*** 0.062
woman 0.201*** 0.040 0.229*** 0.066 0.204*** 0.041
children 0.428*** 0.053 0.423*** 0.062 0.451*** 0.052
each child 0.143*** 0.018 0.141*** 0.021 0.151*** 0.017
Four children man 0.344*** 0.070 0.315*** 0.078 0.334*** 0.068
woman 0.191*** 0.045 0.220*** 0.064 0.201*** 0.045
children 0.465*** 0.061 0.466*** 0.066 0.465*** 0.059
each child 0.116*** 0.015 0.116*** 0.017 0.116*** 0.015
Coastal man 0.098** 0.040 0.064 0.039 0.109*** 0.039
woman -0.048* 0.028 -0.015 0.025 -0.051* 0.029
children -0.050 0.037 -0.049 0.045 -0.058 0.038
Forest man 0.000 0.032 0.013 0.031 0.014 0.031
woman 0.040 0.025 0.050* 0.026 0.040 0.026
children -0.040 0.030 -0.063* 0.037 -0.053* 0.031
Savannah man 0.021 0.037 0.030 0.038 0.032 0.037
woman 0.044 0.027 -0.007 0.026 0.044 0.028
children -0.065* 0.034 -0.023 0.043 -0.076** 0.035
Rural man 0.023 0.022 0.037 0.024 0.022 0.022
household woman 0.041** 0.016 0.010 0.014 0.040** 0.017
children -0.064*** 0.022 -0.047* 0.026 -0.061*** 0.022
Average age man -0.008** 0.004 -0.009* 0.005 -0.007 0.004
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of children woman -0.008** 0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.008** 0.004
children 0.014*** 0.004 0.010** 0.005 0.015*** 0.004
Proportion of man 0.095*** 0.025 0.082*** 0.024 0.098*** 0.025
male children woman -0.043** 0.020 -0.048** 0.019 -0.045** 0.020
children -0.052*** 0.021 -0.033 0.029 -0.053*** 0.022
Owns land man -0.020 0.021 -0.062** 0.026 -0.018 0.021
woman -0.062*** 0.016 -0.071*** 0.023 -0.064*** 0.016
children 0.082*** 0.022 0.133*** 0.028 0.082*** 0.022
Working man -0.041 0.032 0.001 0.030 -0.035 0.032
mother woman 0.025 0.023 0.006 0.022 0.024 0.023
children 0.016 0.024 -0.008 0.031 0.011 0.024
Working man 0.075** 0.031 0.034 0.033 0.077* 0.031
children woman -0.005 0.021 0.025 0.023 -0.005 0.021
children -0.070*** 0.026 -0.059 0.036 -0.072*** 0.026
Number of man 0.035 0.023 0.013 0.024 0.033 0.023
children<3yrs woman -0.046*** 0.015 -0.035** 0.016 -0.047*** 0.015
children 0.010 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.014 0.020
Father’s age man -0.002 0.019 0.014 0.023 -0.006 0.022
above average woman 0.005 0.016 0.002 0.014 0.007 0.016
children -0.002 0.020 -0.016 0.023 -0.001 0.019
Mother’s age man -0.072*** 0.026 -0.084*** 0.030 -0.072*** 0.025
above average woman 0.040** 0.017 -0.013 0.016 0.042** 0.017
children 0.032 0.022 0.097*** 0.030 0.030 0.022
Man’s man -0.002 0.007 0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.007
education woman 0.012** 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.012** 0.006
children -0.010 0.006 -0.006 0.008 -0.009 0.006
Woman’s man -0.019** 0.007 -0.025*** 0.009 -0.019** 0.008
education woman 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.005
children 0.018*** 0.007 0.025*** 0.009 0.018*** 0.007
Christian man -0.074** 0.037 -0.076** 0.034 -0.077** 0.037
father woman 0.032* 0.019 -0.012 0.017 0.032* 0.019
children 0.042 0.031 0.088** 0.036 0.045 0.031
Muslim man -0.084** 0.038 -0.079** 0.035 -0.084** 0.038
father woman 0.039* 0.021 0.007 0.018 0.034 0.021
children 0.045 0.032 0.072** 0.038 0.050 0.032
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Appendix 2.C GMM Estimation
Table 2.C.1: GMM Estimates
SUR3 GMM4
Household Individual
characteristic type Estimate StdErr1 Estimate
One child man 0.339∗∗∗ 0.054 0.337
woman 0.301∗∗∗ 0.044 0.301
children 0.360∗∗∗ 0.049 0.362
Extra child2 man -0.017∗ 0.010 -0.018
woman -0.024∗∗∗ 0.008 0.023
children 0.041∗∗∗ 0.010 0.041
Rural man 0.011 0.022 0.011
household woman 0.027 0.017 0.027
children -0.039∗∗ 0.021 -0.039
Working man 0.096∗∗∗ 0.030 0.097
children woman -0.007 0.019 0.008
children -0.089∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.089
Number of man 0.018 0.022 0.017
children<3yrs woman -0.038∗∗ 0.015 -0.038
children 0.020 0.020 0.021
Proportion of man 0.116∗∗∗ 0.026 0.116
male children woman -0.034∗ 0.020 -0.034
children -0.082∗∗∗ 0.023 -0.082
Man’s man -0.001 0.007 -0.004
education woman 0.009 0.006 0.009
children -0.007 0.007 -0.007
Woman’s man -0.019∗∗ 0.007 -0.019
education woman 0.001 0.005 0.002
children 0.018∗∗∗ 0.007 0.017
1 Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
2 Household dummies are replaced by a scalar valued number of children variable called the ‘extra
child’ variable.
3 Columns 3 and 4 present non-linear SUR results which are analogous to estimates presented in the
rightmost columns of Table 2.2. The change from household dummies to the extra child variable
does not change the qualitative implications of our results.
4 Column 5 presents the GMM estimates. The endogenous regressors are extra child and total
expenditure. We notice that the GMM estimates are very similar to the non-linear SUR estimates.
We also estimate a model where only the extra child variable is treated as endogenous and arrive
at the same conclusions. Based on these, we conclude that even if some endogeneity is present in
our model, it is not significant enough to affect the qualitative results of our model. The standard
errors of the GMM estimators are unknown since the model did not converge.
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Chapter 3
Children’s Resource Shares: Male
versus Female-headed Households
Abstract
This study conducts a comparative study of children’s resource shares in male-headed and
female-headed households. To this end, we extend a modern collective model developed by
Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013) by incorporating Mundlak (1978) terms. The extended
model is then applied to a rotating panel of households from the Jamaican Survey of Living
Conditions over a period of 21 years (1990 - 2010). The panel nature of our data allows us
to control for unobserved household heterogeneities which are shown to play an important
role in the results. We find that the gender of the household head plays an important role
in determining individual resource shares within the household. Our results also indicate that
children receive substantially larger resource shares in female-headed households than in male-
headed ones and hence children who live in relatively poor female-headed households are not
necessarily worse off. The marginal effects of household characteristics on the resource shares
of children are shown to vary considerably based on the gender of the household head.
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3.1 Introduction
The growing incidence of female headship of households across the world has motivated
considerable policy research because of its link to poverty, gender inequality, and child welfare.
A recent study by the United Nations (2017) estimates the proportion of female-headed
households (FHHs) to be 34% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 27% in Africa , and 19%
in Asia. Importantly, it has been argued widely that, compared to male-headed households
(MHHs), FHHs are likely to be poorer and more vulnerable as women tend to have less access
to productive resources such as land and capital (Buvinic and Gupta, 1997), credit (Zeller
and Sharma, 1997), and receive lower wages compared to men for similar jobs (Boxill and
Quarless, 2005). For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (2005, p. 299-308)
estimates that women in Latin America and the Caribbean earn only 40% of men’s incomes.
This implies that FHHs are more likely to raise children with lower health and educational
outcomes, leading to lower labour market outcomes in the long run (Handa, 1994). On the
other hand, the general consensus in the literature is that the preferences of women tend to
favour children, where studies such as Duflo (2003), Duflo and Udry (2004), and Caiumi and
Perali (2015) have shown that women spend more on child-related goods such as food, health
and education, while men spend more on adult-specific goods, such as tobacco and alcohol.
Hence, in FHHs, and in single-mother households in particular, the well-being of children may
increase as a result of higher expenditure on child-friendly goods. Since both arguments are
equally plausible, the actual impact of female headship on child welfare in specific contexts can
only be determined empirically.
This study addresses this issue by investigating the relationship between the gender of the
household head and the nature of intra-household resource allocation using a modern collective
household model. To the best of our knowledge this study is the first to compare FHHs to MHHs
within this framework. Arguably such an analysis is essential to understanding inequality and
poverty as it enables policy makers to not only identify the poorest households, but also to
determine which individual household members are likely to be the most vulnerable. While
recent literature on intra-household inequality have found that women and children tend to
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be poorer than men living in the same households (Dunbar et al., 2013; Bargain et al., 2014;
Mangiavacchi et al., 2014), these papers have focused on traditional MHHs which consist of
couples and their children.
In this study, we estimate the levels of resource shares allocated to adults and children
within MHHs and FHHs in Jamaica, an island country situated in the Caribbean. Jamaica
is an interesting test case for the analysis at hand since it has one of the highest incidences
of FHHs in the world. According to an executive summary of the 2012 Jamaican Survey of
Living Conditions, 45.6% of all households in Jamaica are female-headed, with 26% of these
households containing a male-adult resident (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2012). Partnered
FHHs usually result when a man is unable to provide financially for his family, is away seeking
job opportunities (Massiah, 1982) or when the household lives in a property owned by the
woman (Handa, 1996a). The report also indicates that FHHs in Jamaica usually bear a greater
dependency burden compared to MHHs since they contain a higher proportion of children.
According to Safa (2007), a high percentage of FHHs usually indicates a matrifocal society.
In fact, various sociological and anthropological studies have established the central role women
and mothers play in Jamaica and the Caribbean society at large (Massiah, 1983; Sargent and
Harris, 1992; Stuart, 1996). The Caribbean is known for its weak conjugal bonds, strong
consanguineal ties and unconventional mating and residential patterns. According to Massiah
(1983) and Safa (1998), weak conjugal unions originated during the slave trade as married slaves
were usually sold separately. Mothers and children were, however, sold together creating strong
consanguineal ties between mothers and children. Also, most young adults in Jamaica tend to
engage in visiting relationships and have children before they enter a residential union such as
a common law relationship1 or marriage (Handa, 1996a; Eggleston et al., 1999). More often
than not, these mating patterns usually force young women to become the sole breadwinner
for the household in the absence of a male adult. In contrast to this, a minority of these
women also willingly choose to be household heads as an adaptive response to local economic
conditions, including high rates of male unemployment, increasing female participation rates
(Handa, 1996a; Safa, 1998) and a high rate of emigration of male adults (Massiah, 1982). They
1A common law relationship exists when a couple share a residence but is not legally married.
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thus take advantage of male absenteeism to secure their own welfare and that of their children,
and to maintain their independence and the custody of their children.
Jamaica has been the subject of a number of previous studies on FHHs, such as Louat et al.
(1993), Handa (1994), Handa (1996a), Handa (1996b), Handa (1996c), and Handa (1998).
While Handa (1996a) attempts to identify the economic factors that lead to the formation of
FHHs in Jamaica using a bargaining model of headship choice, Louat et al. (1993) and Handa
(1994) evaluate the relationship between gender, headship and child welfare using reduced
form regressions. Their findings indicate that children raised in FHHs are not necessarily
disadvantaged when compared to children in MHHs with similar characteristics. The results of
Handa (1996b) support this notion as well. Using standard Engel curves, Handa (1996b) finds
that FHHs in Jamaica tend to spend more on food, education and children’s clothing, and less
on alcohol and tobacco. However, it is important to note that none of these papers estimates
the share of resources that is allocated to the different members of the household.2
Within Jamaica’s unique sociocultural context, we estimate and conduct a comparative
analysis of children’s resource shares in MHHs and FHHs using the modern household collective
model developed by Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013) (DLP hereafter). We apply this
model to a rotating panel constructed from the Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC
hereafter) for the period from 1990 to 2010. In terms of methodology, our study is also original
since, to the best of our knowledge, this kind of collective model has not yet been used with
panel data. Using such data allows us to control (at least partially) for possible endogeneity
in our model by accounting for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneities within households.
We do this by incorporating Mundlak’s (1978) approach to panel data into the DLP model.
In particular, we include time averages of all time-varying covariates (also known as Mundlak
terms) in our regression model to control for household time invariant effects. Similar to
Roberts and Taylor (2017) who also account for individual fixed effects in the context of intra-
household commuting choices, we implement our model using a seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) model.
2More recent literature such as Gaiha and Kulkarni (2005), Klasen et al. (2015) and Liu et al. (2017) analyse
FHHs in Asia and Latin America. Again, these studies do not estimate actual resource shares of individual
household members.
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Our results indicate that not taking these time invariant unobserved household
heterogeneities into account leads to both upward and downward biases in our estimates. With
respect to children’s resource shares, our findings suggest that children who live in and around
the capital city (that is, in the Kingston Metropolitan Area) are worse off, irrespective of
whether they live in a MHH or a FHH. Our results also indicate that, in contrast to MHHs,
remittances and other forms of support from family and friends significantly increase the
resource shares of children in single-mother households. A likely reason for this is the tradition
of child fostering in Jamaica. We also find evidence that suggests that female heads prefer
male children to female children. A possible explanation for this is that male children are more
likely to contribute to household income at an earlier age than female children. In addition,
more educated female heads are found to spend more on housing and private primary and
secondary education, and less on children’s clothing and footwear, arguably in an attempt
to provide a safer and more nurturing environment for their children. Also, expenditure on
primary education is usually treated as an investment in human capital for possible future
contributions to the household, especially for boys. In sum, our findings show that children in
more vulnerable FHHs may be compensated by higher resource shares and hence may not be
worse off in terms of welfare outcomes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the theoretical
framework of this essay by discussing both the DLP model and the Mundlak framework and how
these two models are merged. Section 3.3 describes the data set, presents summary statistics and
discusses the empirical implementation of the model. Section 3.4 presents our main empirical
findings, while Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical and Empirical Framework
This section presents the theoretical framework of the study. The first part provides a
brief description of the DLP model for the present context, while the second part discusses the
Mundlak (1978) approach to panel data, how it relates to obtaining fixed effects estimates, and
how we incorporate its framework into the DLP model.
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3.2.1 The DLP Framework
As previously discussed Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, the DLP model is a collective household
model that estimates resource shares of individual household members with a particular focus
on the shares of children. In some previous versions of the collective model, children are not
treated as individuals who have preferences of their own; they are either treated as public
goods for parents or as a household characteristic (see Blundell et al., 2005 for example). As
DLP argues, children are unique members of the household because in most cases they are
unable to make a choice as to which household to belong to, may find it difficult to leave in
strenuous circumstances, and do not contribute to household income substantially. Hence, they
are likely to be the most vulnerable individuals within a household. Other collective household
models that estimate the share of resources allocated to children include Bargain et al. (2010),
Bargain and Donni (2012) and Bargain et al. (2014). Compared to these models, the DLP
model offers the most flexible framework for our study because of its empirical tractability,
milder assumptions with respect to individual preferences and lower data requirements.3
In this essay, the model in Section 2.2.2 is slightly modified to suit the present data set.
Assuming PIGLOG preferences (Muellbauer, 1976) for household members, the model takes
the following form:
Waj(y) = ηaj(δaj + βaj ln ηaj) + ηaj βaj ln y
Wcj(y) = jηcj(δcj + βcj ln ηcj) + jηcj βcj ln y (3.1)
for i = a, c and j = 1, 2, 3, 4. The subscripts i and j represent individual and household types
respectively. Similar to the previous application in Chapter 2, household types are determined
by the size of the household; j = 1, 2, 3, 4 indexes households with one, two, three, and four
children, respectively. Each household consists of two individual types: adults denoted by
i = a, and children denoted by i = c. In the original DLP model and the previous essay,
each household consists of three individual types: a male adult, a female adult, and children.
With the present application of the model, we are unable to distinguish between the spending
3All these models (including DLP) build on the pioneering work of Browning et al. (2013) and Lewbel and
Pendakur (2008).
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patterns of men and women living in the same household because of data restrictions. It is
important to note that time subscripts4 and demographic variables such as age and education
are suppressed in this section to simplify notation.
Wij represents the household budget share of individual i’s private assignable good. As
previously mentioned, the identification of resource shares in this model is heavily dependent
on the existence of private assignable goods for each individual type. In this essay, adult’s and
children’s clothing and footwear are used as the private assignable goods because expenditures
on these goods are observed separately in the JSLC. Similar to the previous chapter, clothing
and footwear make up only a small proportion of total household expenditure. A study by
Bargain et al. (2018) shows that this is not likely to be an issue because of the suitability of these
particular goods (clothing and footwear) to the individual preference restrictions that BCL-type
models impose, especially SAT. Using a unique data set from Bangladesh, the study finds that
clothing and footwear perform best when compared to other available private assignable goods
(such as food, health, education, and other personal effects) when estimating actual individual
resource shares.
It is important to note that unlike DLP and Bargain et al. (2014), we are unable to estimate
the share of men and women separately as we do not have separate private assignable goods
for men and women in our data set. This is, however, not a huge loss in this context since the
main focus of this study is to compare children’s resource shares in MHHs to children’s resource
shares in FHHs. Also, although the DLP model and other BCL-type models are based on a
particular private assignable good, it is worth emphasising that the model estimates overall
individual shares of total household expenditure for all goods.
y denotes total household expenditure, ηij denotes the resource share of individual i in
household type j, while δij and βij represent the intercept preference parameters and the latent
slope preference parameters respectively. Again, βij is specified according to which restriction
is applied to the shapes of the Engel curves. If SAP is imposed, βij = βj for all i. If SAT is
imposed, βij = βi for all j. If both SAP and SAT are imposed, βij = β for all i and j.
4Strictly speaking, time subscripts should be included in the model as we are dealing with a panel data set.
They are defined explicitly in the following subsection where we focus on modelling household fixed effects.
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3.2.2 The Mundlak Framework and Household Fixed Effects
In an attempt to adjust the original DLP model to fit a panel data set, we incorporate
Mundlak’s (1978) approach as this enables us to control for unobserved heterogeneities at the
household level which do not vary with time. As already mentioned, using a panel data set
and accounting for these household fixed effects could control (at least partially) for possible
endogeneity that may exist in the original DLP model. DLP address these endogeneity
issues in their paper by using instrumental variables. In cases, such as ours, where viable
instrumental variables cannot be obtained from the available data set, controlling for household
heterogeneities in a panel-data setting is an alternative route researchers can take to control
for possible endogeneity in the DLP model. Consider the Mundlak (1978) framework using the
simple unobserved effects model below:
yst = xstψ + vs + ust (3.2)
where s = (1, 2, ..., S) denotes the cross-sectional unit (which is the household in our case), and
t = (1, 2, ..., T ) denotes the time period. xst is a matrix of observable explanatory variables
which may change across both s and t, or across s but not t, or across t but not s. ψ represents
the matrix of coefficients, vs denotes the unobserved heterogeneities which are time-invariant
and ust represents idiosyncratic disturbances which vary across s and t.
The key concern with vs in this kind of set-up is whether or not it is correlated with xst.
If the two terms are correlated, a fixed effects estimation approach is appropriate. However,
fixed effects estimation can be difficult to carry out in non-linear models such as the DLP
model because of the incidental parameters problem for instance. Under such circumstances, a
correlated random effects (CRE) framework such as the Mundlak (1978) approach can provide
a useful alternative. One should note that the difference between this framework and the pure
fixed effects approach is that with CRE, the relationship between vs and xst is modelled in a
very specific way (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 286). More specifically, Mundlak (1978) allows vs to
depend on time averages or panel-level averages of the observed covariates (xst) that vary over
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time so that:
vs = x̄sπ + ws (3.3)
where x̄s denotes the time averages of time-varying covariates in xst, π is the matrix of
coefficients, and ws is the error term which is independently and identically distributed. These
time averages or panel-level averages are usually referred to as Mundlak terms. Substituting
Equation (3.3) into Equation (3.2) gives the following expanded model:
yst = xstψ + x̄sπ + ws + ust. (3.4)
It is important to note that the error term in Equation (3.4) is a sum of ws and ust. A generalized
least squares (GLS) estimation of Equation (3.4) is efficient and produces an estimator of ψ
that equals the fixed effects estimator (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 719).
We incorporate this framework into the DLP model by including Mundlak terms in the
intercept preference parameters (δij), the slope preference parameters (βij), and the resource
share functions (ηij) of Equation (3.1). Then we estimate Equation (3.1) using an iterated
feasible generalized non-linear least squares estimation method within a non-linear seemingly
unrelated model framework. This produces the fixed effects estimator for the explanatory
variables that vary across s and t. Due to the complicated nature of the error term in this
model, we obtain fully robust inferences by using an unrestricted variance-covariance matrix.5
In spite of the fact that Mundlak (1978) makes certain strong assumptions about the
relationship that exists between vs and xst, his approach has two main advantages over a
pure fixed effects approach. First, unlike the pure fixed effects approach, we are able to include
time-invariant variables in our estimation. Second, the Mundlak approach is also an indirect
way of testing the correlation between vs and xst. If vs and xst are correlated, that is, if
fixed effects assumptions hold, the Mundlak terms (x̄s) must be jointly significant within the
expanded model.
5We implement this in Stata using the "cluster" option instead of the "robust" option.
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3.3 Empirical Implementation
We describe our data set and present some summary statistics for each family type in the
first part of this section. The second part discusses the specification of our model and the
estimation method we use in implementing it.
3.3.1 Data Set
The Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC) is a nation-wide survey that was
introduced in 1988 to monitor the economic welfare of households within the country. Since
1990 the survey has been carried out on an annual basis (except for 2011 when the survey
was not conducted). Its core modules include health, education, consumption, nutrition, and
housing. For most years an additional module is included that focuses on specific subjects such
as remittances, coping strategies, ageing and employment.
The JSLC is tagged to the national Labour Force Survey (LFS hereafter) which is carried
out using a one-half panel design. This means that half of the households from a previous
round of the LFS, and by extension, the JSLC, are included in the current sample as long as
the master frame is not changed. This one-half panel design enables us to construct a rotating
panel of households for the following years: 1990-1992, 1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 1998-
2000, 2002-2003, 2004-2006, and 2007-2010. We follow Handa’s (2008) procedure in matching
households across different rounds of the JSLC. First, we construct a unique household identifier
that is used to match households across years. Before households are matched, we verify that
the gender of the household head has not changed, that his/her age did not change by more
than 2 years, and that the household size did not change by more than 2 people. Using this
criteria, and similar to Handa (2008), we are able to match about 70% of the households across
years. Our match rates are slightly higher in later years of the sample period. We use monthly
Consumer Price Indices from the Bank of Jamaica to deflate all monetary values with December
2006 as the base value.
We restrict our sample to monogamous nuclear households for three reasons. First, the
private assignable goods that are available from our data set allow individual resource shares
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to be easily identified in these kinds of households. Taking this a step further, we also exclude
households with children older than 13 to ensure that clothing and footwear cannot be shared
between adults and children within the same household since these goods are crucial for the
identification of resource shares.6 Second, restricting our sample to nuclear monogamous
households ensures that the structure of MHHs and FHHs are as similar as possible and hence
makes them more comparable. This also means that conclusions drawn from the comparative
analysis are likely to be more robust and reliable. Third and most importantly, it significantly
reduces the bias that may be present in the identification of household heads. These biases
are usually greater in extended family households where the oldest male adult assumes the
position of the household head even if he is not the individual responsible for the upkeep
and maintenance of the family (Handa, 1994). Finally, one should note that we also include
partnered FHHs in our sample because they enable us to determine whether the presence of a
male adult in a FHH adversely affects the resource shares children receive when compared to
single-mother households.
Our final sample consists of 479 MHHs consisting of a couple with one to four children,
304 FHHs consisting of a single mother with one to four children, and 159 FHHs consisting of
a couple with one to four children. According to Rosenhouse (1989), MHHs usually indicate
an intact couple whereas FHHs usually represent a single female or a female in some sort of
consensual union. In our sample, we find that all partnered households (whether MHH or
FHH) indicate an intact couple in that the couple is either married or have a common law
relationship. About 58% of the couples in the MHHs are in a common law relationship, while
42% are married. Similarly, 79% of the couples in partnered FHHs are in a common law
relationship while 21% are married. The higher percentage of common law relationships among
partnered FHHs is not surprising as one of the social requirements for marriage for a man in
Jamaican culture is to own a house (Handa, 1996a). It is therefore plausible that in these
partnered FHHs the women tend to own the houses in which they live. It could also be an
indication that the man in the household is unable to bear the economic burden of maintaining
6This is common practice within the literature (see DLP, Bargain and Donni, 2012 and Bargain et al., 2014
for example). In addition to this, the JSLC treats children older than 13 as adults. Therefore, they are able to
enter the labour market freely.
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the household and hence has very little bargaining power in the household (Handa, 1996a).
The single-mother FHHs in our sample suit the definition of FHHs found in Rosenhouse (1989)
to a large extent; only 9% of them are married or engaged in a common law relationship. 87%
of them are either single or engaged in a visiting relationship, while 4% of them report to be
in no sort of union. In total, our sample is made up of 942 households and 2,043 observations
(on average, each household is followed for 2 two years).
We present summary statistics according to the different household categories in Table 3.1.
The men in our sample are generally older than the women for all partnered households. On
average, women are more likely than men to attend tertiary education. According to Reddock
(2009), the female share of tertiary education in Jamaica is about 70%. This is because in
Jamaica the pecuniary returns associated with additional education is much larger for women
than for men (Handa, 1996c; Boxill and Quarless, 2005). Men, on the other hand are more
likely to pursue vocational training after their secondary school education (STATIN and PIOJ,
2014). Similar to Handa (1996c), we find that FHHs are more likely to live in urban households.
It is also clear from weekly expenditure values that on average MHHs are wealthier than FHHs.
Let us now turn to the budget shares of goods which represent the weights which each
household gives to each of these goods. Generally, all households spend most of their income
on food, housing, and transportation and communication. With regard to the private assignable
goods, the share of adult clothing and footwear is roughly equal across all household categories.
In other words, equal weights are given to adult clothing and footwear in each household
category. On the other hand, FHHs (especially single-mother households) tend to put a higher
weight on children’s clothing and footwear than MHHs although MHHs may spend more in
absolute terms on children’s clothing and footwear due to higher overall expenditure levels.
Single-mother households also tend to have highest budget shares for other child-related goods
such as health and education, and the lowest budget shares for vices (alcohol and tobacco),
which are more adult-specific. The share of vices doubles in all partnered households and is
highest in partnered FHHs where the male adult is more likely to be idle and not involved in
any economic activity. This could be seen as preliminary evidence in support of Duflo (2003),
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Sample by Family Type
MHHs FHHs All
Couples Couples Single mothers
with children with children with children
General Characteristics
Men’s age 36.2 34.9 - 35.9
(8.51) (7.62) (8.34)
Women’s age 31.3 30.5 32.3 31.5
(8.28) (6.78) (7.86) (7.96)
Men’s tertiary education dummy 0.09 0.02 - 0.08
(0.29) (0.15) (0.27)
Women’s tertiary education dummy 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.09
(0.29) (0.24) (0.28) (0.28)
Proportion of male children 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51
(0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.40)
Average age of children 5.6 6.1 7.0 6.1
(3.06) (2.86) (2.88) (3.04)
Rural household dummy 0.55 0.48 0.40 0.49
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Weekly expenditure in J$ 8,569.30 6,868.08 6,042.24 7,519.14
(6852.48) (3686.95) (5218.34) (6088.26)
Budget Shares
Adult’s clothing and footwear 0.056 0.057 0.055 0.056
(0.041) (0.037) (0.046) (0.042)
Children’s clothing and footwear 0.041 0.046 0.057 0.047
(0.030) (0.031) (0.038) (0.034)
Food 0.491 0.543 0.516 0.507
(0.194) (0.162) (0.187) (0.188)
Housing 0.111 0.093 0.124 0.113
(0.110) (0.112) (0.123) (0.115)
Transportation and communication 0.114 0.103 0.085 0.103
(0.107) (0.094) (0.077) (0.097)
Health 0.020 0.017 0.022 0.020
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Education 0.040 0.037 0.051 0.043
(0.071) (0.043) (0.059) (0.064)
Vices 0.012 0.013 0.006 0.010
(0.033) (0.032) (0.026) (0.031)
Sample size (households) 479 159 304 942
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Duflo and Udry (2004), and Caiumi and Perali (2015), who show that women’s preferences
tend to be more child-friendly. On average, we also find that single mothers tend to spend
more on housing compared to other households. This may be because a larger proportion of
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single-mother households live in urban areas where housing is more expensive.
We present detailed summary statistics for each household type in Appendix 3.A. There are
a few things worth noting from these tables. First, for all household categories, as the number
of children in the household increases, the household expenditure share on adult’s clothing and
footwear tends to roughly decline while the share on children’s clothing and footwear tends to
rise. This supports the notion in the literature that children impose economic costs on parents
(Browning, 1992; Bargain et al., 2010; Bargain and Donni, 2012; Bargain et al., 2014). Second,
the share for typical public goods such as housing, transportation and communication, and
even health tend to decrease as the number of individuals in the household increase. Since
these goods are not luxuries, a plausible explanation for this is the presence of substantial scale
economies within the household. On the other hand, the share of typical private goods such as
food and education increase with the size of the household. Again, this is true for all household
categories.
3.3.2 Model Specification and Estimation Method
Based on our data set, we include the following demographic variables in our model: the
region of residence (rural area, other urban area, and the Kingston Metropolitan Area as the
reference category), the age of the man, the age of the woman, the minimum age of the children
in the household, the number of children aged less than three, the proportion of male children,
dummies indicating whether the man and the woman have completed tertiary education, a
dummy indicating whether the household receives remittances or other support from family
and friends elsewhere in Jamaica, a dummy indicating whether the household receives any form
of public assistance or poor relief, and a dummy indicating whether a male-adult is resident
in a FHH. Similar to the previous essay, these demographic variables are included in both the
resource share functions (ηij) and the preference functions (δij and βij) of Equation (3.1) and
hence cannot be described as distribution factors.
Following DLP, we estimate our log-linear Engel curves (Equation (3.1)) using an iterated
non-linear seemingly unrelated regression model. We allow the errors to be correlated across
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the two equations. We estimate two models: one with no Mundlak terms and another where
Mundlak terms are included to account for the unobserved heterogeneities within the household.
We refer to the model without Mundlak terms as our baseline model because it is used as a
benchmark against which to compare the model with includes Mundlak terms. To construct
these Mundlak terms, we calculate time averages or panel-level averages of all demographic
variables that change across time. Apart from variables indicating the region of residence, all
other demographic variables vary across time. Hence, we construct Mundlak terms for 10 out
of 12 demographic covariates.
Let d = (d1, d2, ..., d12) be a vector of all the demographic variables, let g = (g1, g2, ..., g10)
be a vector of the Mundlak terms and b = (b1, ..., b4) be a vector of four dummy variables, each
indicating a household type j. The vector b plays the role of the constant for each household
type in ηij, δij, and βij. For the baseline model, ηij and δij are specified as linear in b and d
for a maximum of 16 coefficients each. As already mentioned, βij is specified according to the
semi-parametric restriction imposed on the Engel curves. For SAP, βij is specified as linear in
b and d for a maximum of 16 coefficients. For SAT, βij is specified as linear in a constant and d
for each of the 2 individual types for a maximum of 26 coefficients. When both SAP and SAT
are imposed, βts is specified as linear in a constant and d for a maximum of 13 coefficients.
For the model with Mundlak terms, ηij and δij are specified as linear in b, d, and g for a
maximum of 26 coefficients each. For SAP, βij is specified as linear in b, d, and g for a maximum
of 26 coefficients. For SAT, βij is specified as linear in a constant, d, and g for each of the 2
individual types for a maximum of 46 coefficients. When both SAP and SAT are imposed, βts
is specified as linear in a constant, d, and g for a maximum of 23 coefficients.7
3.4 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the main empirical findings of this study. Both the baseline
model and the model with Mundlak terms are carried out for all MHHs, all FHHs, and also
7We are unable to add year dummies as our models do not converge due to relatively small sample sizes.
We attempt to include period dummies and find that our results do not change significantly for the models that
do converge. This is probably due to the fact that, we follow households for just 2 years on average.
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for single-mother households only. For each of these household categories, we impose the SAP
restriction alone, the SAT restriction alone, and both SAP and SAT restrictions. Similar to
the application on Ghanaian data, we find the SAT restriction to be the weakest identifying
assumption for all household categories. As explained by DLP, one may need a very large
sample size to produce precise estimates when the SAT restriction alone is imposed. In this
section, we focus on estimates from imposing both restrictions, because for the most part these
estimates are the most precise. Also, upon testing the validity of the SAT restriction given
the SAP restriction, we conclude that the SAT restriction holds in our data set once the SAP
restriction has already been imposed.8
Our results from the baseline model and the model with Mundlak terms (see Table 3.B.1
in Appendix 3.B) show that for all household categories, estimates differ appreciably in terms
of statistical significance and magnitude once Mundlak terms are included in the model. For
instance, with respect to the household size dummies, we observe that while the value of adult
resource shares are underestimated in the baseline model for MHHs, they are overestimated
in single-mother households. In addition to this, for FHHs in particular, we notice that the
sign of some coefficients also change. According to Wooldridge (2013), when estimates differ
substantially and in a statistically significant way, a fixed effects framework such as the one
we use, is usually appropriate. Most importantly, for each household type, the Mundlak terms
are jointly significant. As previously indicated, the joint significance of Mundlak terms means
that fixed effects assumptions are satisfied and hence the model including the Mundlak terms
is appropriate.
Resource Share Estimates with Household Fixed Effects
Table 3.2 presents the estimates of the resource share functions (ηij) when both SAP and
SAT are imposed as identifying restrictions, and when unobserved household heterogeneities are
8Following DLP, we do this by first estimating our model imposing only the SAP restriction. We then test
the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the household size dummies inside βij are statistically equal using
a Wald test as this is equivalent to imposing the SAT restriction. For all three household categories, we find
that this null hypothesis cannot be rejected with p-values of 0.2715, 0.3729, and 0.3017 for MHHs, FHHs, and
single-mother households respectively. Therefore, we conclude that the SAT restriction is valid once the SAP
restriction has already been imposed.
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accounted for using Mundlak terms. The results for three household categories are presented:
all MHHs, all FHHs (including single-mother households), and only single-mother households.
Following DLP, the household size dummies outline the resource shares for adults, children,
and each child in a reference household. A reference household is a household that has a value
of zero for all demographic variables included in the model. In our case, this household lives in
the Kingston Metropolitan Area, does not receive any support from friends and family within
or outside the country, and does not receive any public assistance or poor relief. All adults in
this household have not completed tertiary education and all children within the household are
girls. The table also lists the marginal effects of a number of demographic variables on these
estimates (see Table 3.C.1 in Appendix 3.C for the marginal effects of all demographic variables
on resource shares).
First, let us discuss the resource share of adults and children in the reference household
found in the first four rows of Table 3.2. Generally, a relatively smaller share of resources is
allocated to children in MHHs. In MHHS, children’s resource shares range from 31% to 8% per
child as the number of children in the household increases, while they range from 52% to 19%
per child in all FHHs and from 56% to 21% per child in single-mother households. This can
be attributed to a number of reasons. First, while all MHHs in our sample consist of 2 adults,
close to 70% of the FHHs are composed of a single adult. Although couples seem to enjoy large
scale economies (when one compares the estimates for MHHs and single-mother households for
instance), children appear to benefit with regards to resource shares from having just one adult
present in the household. Second, this could indicate that the preferences of women in Jamaica
are more child-related and hence, as household heads, they are able to allocate a larger share
of resources to the children. We also notice that, unlike MHHs, the total share of resources for
adults consistently declines with the number of children in FHHs and single-mother households.
For all three categories of households, the per-capita share for children decreases substantially
as the number of children in the household increases. Again, this could be an indication that
large scale economies to consumption exist among the children as well.
Let us now turn to the demographic variables. With regard to the region of residence,
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characteristic type Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr
One child adults 0.688*** 0.083 0.479*** 0.069 0.441*** 0.068
children 0.312*** 0.083 0.521*** 0.069 0.559*** 0.068
each child 0.312*** 0.083 0.521*** 0.069 0.559*** 0.068
Two children adults 0.636*** 0.086 0.416*** 0.073 0.412*** 0.076
children 0.364*** 0.086 0.584*** 0.073 0.588*** 0.076
each child 0.182*** 0.043 0.292*** 0.035 0.294*** 0.038
Three children adults 0.594*** 0.085 0.416*** 0.090 0.410*** 0.088
children 0.406*** 0.085 0.584*** 0.090 0.590*** 0.088
each child 0.135*** 0.028 0.195*** 0.030 0.197*** 0.029
Four children adults 0.684*** 0.105 0.261*** 0.098 0.150 0.105
children 0.316*** 0.105 0.739*** 0.098 0.850*** 0.105
each child 0.079*** 0.026 0.185*** 0.025 0.213*** 0.026
Other urban adults -0.081** 0.038 -0.109*** 0.039 -0.147*** 0.049
areas children 0.081** 0.038 0.109*** 0.039 0.147*** 0.049
Rural areas adults -0.144*** 0.032 -0.082** 0.041 -0.117** 0.048
children 0.144*** 0.032 0.082** 0.041 0.117** 0.048
Number of children adults 0.119** 0.054 0.188*** 0.068 0.229*** 0.067
< 3years old children -0.119** 0.054 -0.188*** 0.068 -0.229*** 0.067
Proportion of adults 0.103 0.110 -0.152* 0.086 -0.194** 0.089
male children children -0.103 0.110 0.152* 0.086 0.194** 0.089
Head completed adults -0.113* 0.063 0.249*** 0.055 0.211*** 0.065
tertiary education children 0.113* 0.063 -0.249*** 0.055 -0.211*** 0.065
Support from others adults -0.003 0.035 -0.062 0.038 -0.094** 0.043
(incl remittances) children 0.003 0.035 0.062 0.038 0.094** 0.043
Public assistance adults -0.167* 0.091 0.001 0.087 0.005 0.085
children 0.167* 0.091 -0.001 0.087 -0.005 0.085
Partner present in adults - - 0.170*** 0.063 - -
FHH children - - -0.170*** 0.063 - -
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
children are generally worse off in terms of resource shares if they live in the Kingston
Metropolitan Area. Up to 15% of resource shares are diverted from children to adults who
live in this area. This holds irrespective of the gender of the household head. However, the
shares of children are highest in rural areas for MHHs and are highest in other urban areas
for FHHs. Since the cost of living is likely to be higher in urban areas (especially the capital
city) than in rural areas (Kurre, 2003), parents in the Kingston Metropolitan Area tend to
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spend more on other goods such as housing and utilities. For instance, within our sample,
households living in the Kingston Metropolitan Area allocate about 15% of total expenditure
to housing and utility bills on average, whereas rural households allocate only 8% of their total
expenditure to housing and utility bills. We find a similar trend for non-consumption goods
such as insurance and the repayment of loans.
Another similarity that exists between MHHs and FHHs is that children’s resource shares
decrease substantially (by 12% to 23%) as the number of children less than three years old
increases within the household. Since 95% of all children in Jamaica are enrolled in school by
their third birthday (National Academy of Sciences, 2015), this result may indicate that parents
tend to spend a lot more on their children once they are enrolled in school. These school-related
expenses include the cost of transportation to school, extra lessons, books, and tuition. Also
the magnitude of this effect is higher in FHHs than in MHHs. This is not surprising because
FHHs and single mothers in particular, tend to invest more in the education of their children
than MHHs. This may be due to the fact that in Jamaica the responsibility of child care falls
predominantly on women. Hence, children are more likely to take care of their elderly mothers
than their elderly fathers (Handa, 1996a; Wyss, 1999; Handa, 1996c).
The next covariate of interest relates to gender bias within the household. Our results
show that single-mother households have a strong preference for male children; about 19% of
household resources are diverted from adults to children as the proportion of boys to girls rises.
While this is true to a smaller extent in partnered FHHs, there appears to be no such bias in
MHHs. Studies such as DLP and Rose (1999) have also found some forms of gender inequality
in favour of the boy child within the household. In patriarchal cultures like those of Eastern
and Southern Asia, this is the common practice (Das Gupta et al., 2003). However, some
anthropological and ethnographic studies, such as Sargent and Harris (1992), find that girls are
generally preferred to boys in Jamaica, although they observe that often a special bond exists
between mothers and sons. They base their arguments on evidence from the patterns of child
abandonment, health, and adoption practices.
In spite of the fact that our results seem to conflict with studies from these other disciplines,
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Table 3.3: Average Expenditure Shares for FHHs
KMA1 Other urban Rural All
Head Head Head Head Head Head Head Head
TE2 no TE TE no TE TE no TE TE no TE
Children’s clothing 0.036 0.058 0.033 0.050 0.040 0.055 0.036 0.055
and footwear
Housing 0.213 0.139 0.147 0.112 0.126 0.083 0.174 0.109
Education 0.053 0.049 0.086 0.044 0.040 0.042 0.056 0.045
1 KMA stands for Kingston Metropolitan Area.
2 TE stands for tertiary education
we argue that by analysing gender bias in Jamaica from an economic perspective, our findings
enrich the pool of knowledge that is already available on the subject. According to Handa
(1996a), single mothers recognize that their older children can become assets to the household,
in that they are able to contribute to household income. This then allows a single mother to
be less dependent on her partner(s) and to maintain her independence. Hence, single mothers
may prefer boys to girls because they are more likely to bring in income at an earlier age since
they tend to enter the labour market earlier than girls do (Handa, 1998). According to Boxill
and Quarless (2005), the rate of absenteeism from school for boys is about three times that of
girls because culturally boys are allowed to participate in the labour market at a very early
age. Girls, on the other hand, usually stay in school and spend the rest of their time engaged
in domestic activities (STATIN and PIOJ, 2014).
The level of education that the household head attains is also an important factor in the
household decision-making process. In MHHs, a man who has completed tertiary education
tends to divert about 11.3% of resources from adults to children. First, this could mean that
more educated men tend to spend more on their children. Second, since previous evidence shows
that women tend to be more concerned about the welfare of children, this finding could also
indicate that a more educated man is likely to be more willing to accommodate the preferences
of his partner. Hence, similar to what Handa (1994) finds, children may also benefit from the
presence of a female decision maker in the household who is not necessarily the head of the
household.
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In contrast to MHHs, a female head who has completed tertiary education tends to divert
over 20% of household resources from children to adults. This is very surprising given that
women are known to be more sensitive to the needs of their children. However, upon further
investigation, we find that compared to their counterparts who have no tertiary education,
female heads who have completed tertiary education tend to spend significantly more on housing
and education and significantly less on children’s clothing and footwear. This is evident in Table
3.3 which presents the average expenditure shares of these goods for female heads who have
completed tertiary education and those who have not. These average values are also presented
separately for each region of residence. From this table, it is clear that these findings are true
particularly in the Kingston Metropolitan Area. Although housing is not seen as a typical
child-related good, it may very well be in the Jamaican context. According to the World Bank
(2004, p. 45-46), urban poverty in Jamaica is associated with vices such as crime and violence.
Hence, especially in the KMA, high-income-earning female heads who have completed tertiary
education (Boxill and Quarless, 2005) tend to move into more decent, respectable, and often
gated communities where housing tends to be very expensive in order to provide a safer and
more nurturing environment for their children. These women also tend to send their children to
private primary schools which are very costly (Heyneman and Stern, 2014). We can therefore
conclude that, even though female heads care about their children’s needs, their spending
patterns may differ depending on their level of education (a variable which is highly correlated
to her level of income) and their region of residence. Accordingly, it may be profitable in certain
scenarios to analyse expenditure shares of other goods that are not traditionally known to be
child-related. It is worth noting that these findings feature prominently in FHHs and not in
MHHs because females in Jamaica are more likely to complete tertiary education and are also
more likely to live in urban areas (STATIN and PIOJ, 2014; Handa, 1996c).
Next, we discuss the support that the household receives from external sources in monetary
form or in the form of goods and services. This support usually comes in two forms: support
received from family and friends living elsewhere in Jamaica or in another country and public
assistance or poor relief from the government (including food stamps, school feeding programme,
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and PATH9). From Table 3.2, our results show that public assistance increases the resource
shares of children in MHHs by almost 17%, whereas support received from family and friends
(including remittances) leads to a rise in children’s resource shares by 9.4% in single-mother
households. For single-mother households, the most likely reason for this is the common practice
of child fostering in Jamaica, where children are sent to live with a member of the extended
family or a friend. According to Wyss (1995), in 1989, more than half of Jamaican children did
not live with their biological fathers, about a quarter did not live with their biological mothers,
and about one-fifth lived apart from both parents. These biological parents usually send money
and/or goods to help with the upkeep of their children. In addition to this, remittances are
becoming more and more important in Jamaica because of the increase in emigration of adults
(especially the male adult) to other countries to look for better employment (Massiah, 1982).
As stated by Stephenson and Wilsker (2016), in 2009, Jamaica was the 14th most reliant
country on remittances in the world, with remittances comprising close to 15% of the country’s
GDP. This reliance of single-mother households on remittances and other forms of support from
family and friends may cause them to be more vulnerable to economic and social shocks since
these sources of income are relatively less stable (Benfield, 2010).
Last but not least, we find that the presence of a male adult in a FHH reduces the share of
children by 17%. As already indicated, this means that children who live with single mothers
tend to have higher resource shares than children who live in partnered FHHs. Although it is
natural for the resource shares of children to reduce as a result of the presence of an additional
adult, this could also indicate that an unpartnered female head is able to fully implement
her preferences without having to bargain with a man. It is however important to note that,
children may benefit both socially and emotionally from the guidance, discipline, and support
that a male adult in the household provides (Handa, 1994). Unfortunately, our study is unable
to take intangible benefits such as these into account.
Based on the estimates in Table 3.2, we calculate the resource shares in each household in
our sample and find that resource shares follow the expected pattern. On average, resource
9PATH is an acronym for the Programme for Advancement through Health and Education. This programme
is a conditional cash transfer programme that was created in 2001 and is aimed at increasing the welfare of
children in poor households through human capital development.
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shares per child are highest in single-mother households. Again, it is important to remember
that this is partly due to the the fact that single- mother households consist of only one adult.
We present means and standard deviations of resource shares according to household categories
in Table 3.D.1 in Appendix 3.D.
3.5 Conclusion
With the increase in the incidence of FHHs in the developing world, investigating the nature
of resource share allocation in these households has become crucial for the development and
effective targeting of redistribution programmes. So far, most studies on household decision-
making have focused on the traditional MHHs consisting of a couple with children. This study
contributes to the literature by carrying out a comparative study of children’s resource shares
in MHHs and FHHs (including single-mother households) using a collective household model
developed by Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2013). We extend this model by incorporating
Mundlak’s (1978) approach. The extended model is then applied to a rotating panel of Jamaican
households covering the period between 1990 and 2010. Using a panel data set allows us to
account for unobserved household heterogeneities that are constant over time, thereby providing
an alternative route to dealing with possible endogeneity that may be present in the DLP model.
Our results indicate that controlling for household fixed effects in this way is appropriate
and improves upon the precision of our estimates. With respect to the distribution of household
resources, we find that in Jamaica the gender of the household head is an important determinant
of the final outcome. In particular, our findings show that the resource shares of children are
substantially higher in FHHs (especially in single-mother households) than in MHHs, where
children in single-mother households receive 56% to 85% of household resources, while children
in MHHs receive only 31% to 41%. In fact, children may be better off in single-mother
households than in partnered FHHs as a male-adult tends to divert about 17% of household
resources from children to adults in partnered FHHs. Hence, children in relatively poor single-
mother households may be compensated by the higher resource shares they receive and thus
may not necessarily be worse off when compared to children in MHHs or partnered FHHs. We
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also find a strong preference for the boy child in FHHs. This may result from the fact that boys
are more likely to contribute significantly to future household income as they tend to enter
the labour market at an earlier age compared to girls (STATIN and PIOJ, 2014). We also
show that the spending patterns of female heads differ depending on their level of education
and their region of residence. More specifically, even though empirical evidence suggests that
women tend to care more about their children’s needs, their preferences may be expressed
by spending on different kinds of goods depending on whether they have completed tertiary
education and whether they live in an urban or rural area. Our findings also indicate that
remittances and other support from family and friends affect the resource shares that children
receive in single-mother households to a greater extent than public assistance. This may be due
to the culture of child fostering in Jamaica. More generally, our study demonstrates that an
increased cultural awareness of the region in question is a crucial component in understanding
the nature of intra-household resource distribution in FHHs.
Finally, it must be noted that our analysis suffers from some drawbacks. First, we are
unable to distinguish between men’s resource shares and women’s resource shares because of
the unavailability of a separate private assignable good for men and women in the JSLC.
Second, it is also impossible to check whether a child lives with his/her biological parents for
a considerable number of years in the JSLC (from 1992 to 1999). These pieces of information
would have greatly increased the depth of our analysis and understanding of intra-household
resource allocation in FHHs vis-à-vis MHHs.
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Appendix 3.A Detailed Summary Statistics
Table 3.A.1: Summary Statistics for Single-Mother Households (FHHs)
Single Mother with All
1 child 2 children 3 children 4 children
General Characteristics
Women’s age 33.3 32.3 30.4 29.2 32.3
(9.68) (6.63) (4.31) (3.21) (7.86)
Women’s tertiary education dummy 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08
(0.31) (0.25) (0.20) (0.25) (0.28)
Proportion of male children 0.58 0.45 0.49 0.60 0.52
(0.49) (0.37) (0.25) (0.26) (0.41)
Average age of children 7.3 6.8 6.7 6.4 7.0
(3.47) (2.53) (1.89) (1.51) (2.88)
Rural household dummy 0.31 0.47 0.51 0.32 0.40
(0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49)
Weekly expenditure (J$) 6,626.62 5,543.40 5,465.42 6,210.63 6,042.24
(7032.70) (2894.76) (2963.12) (4193.87) (5218.34)
Budget Shares
Adult’s clothing and footwear 0.061 0.050 0.049 0.054 0.055
(0.046) (0.041) (0.060) (0.039) (0.046)
Children’s clothing and footwear 0.049 0.059 0.067 0.086 0.057
(0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.055) (0.038)
Food 0.460 0.543 0.586 0.605 0.516
(0.190) (0.170) (0.181) (0.145) (0.187)
Housing 0.156 0.116 0.067 0.070 0.124
(0.128) (0.122) (0.085) (0.084) (0.123)
Transportation and communication 0.094 0.081 0.077 0.051 0.085
(0.084) (0.075) (0.063) (0.045) (0.077)
Health 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.011 0.022
(0.029) (0.026) (0.023) (0.010) (0.027)
Education 0.046 0.052 0.062 0.043 0.051
(0.054) (0.061) (0.068) (0.038) (0.059)
Vices 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.029) (0.025) (0.021) (0.016) (0.026)
Sample size 139 126 58 22 304
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3.A.2: Summary Statistics for Male-Headed Households
MHHs Couples with All
1 child 2 children 3 children 4 children
General Characteristics
Men’s age 36.5 35.3 37.0 37.0 36.2
(10.17) (6.84) (7.96) (6.66) (8.51)
Women’s age 31.7 30.6 31.3 32.2 31.3
(10.00) (6.79) (7.59) (5.62) (8.28)
Men’s tertiary education dummy 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.09
(0.32) (0.29) (0.24) (0.18) (0.29)
Women’s tertiary education dummy 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.10
(0.32) (0.31) (0.19) (0.24) (0.29)
Proportion of male children 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.51
(0.50) (0.35) (0.28) (0.25) (0.40)
Average age of children 5.4 5.4 6.1 6.2 5.6
(3.58) (2.87) (2.46) (1.84) (3.06)
Rural household dummy 0.49 0.55 0.62 0.63 0.55
(0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Weekly expenditure (J$) 8,593.76 9,056.25 8,295.42 6,868.16 8,569.30
(7195.91) (7152.52) (6413.48) (3657.81) (6852.48)
Budget Shares
Adult’s clothing and footwear 0.059 0.057 0.050 0.053 0.056
(0.042) (0.045) (0.035) (0.030) (0.041)
Children’s clothing and footwear 0.031 0.042 0.050 0.061 0.041
(0.022) (0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.030)
Food 0.458 0.495 0.526 0.570 0.491
(0.199) (0.195) (0.182) (0.158) (0.194)
Housing 0.128 0.105 0.102 0.072 0.111
(0.114) (0.110) (0.107) (0.088) (0.110)
Transportation and communication 0.130 0.109 0.107 0.068 0.114
(0.109) (0.109) (0.101) (0.066) (0.107)
Health 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.020
(0.024) (0.027) (0.020) (0.018) (0.024)
Education 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.037 0.040
(0.059) (0.086) (0.068) (0.045) (0.071)
Vices 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.017 0.012
(0.027) (0.042) (0.018) (0.038) (0.033)
Sample size 210 203 105 50 479
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3.A.3: Summary Statistics for Partnered Female-Headed Households
FHHs Couples with All
1 child 2 children 3 children 4 children
General Characteristics
Men’s age 33.8 35.3 35.2 35.8 34.9
(8.42) (7.90) (6.62) (6.75) (7.62)
Women’s age 29.9 30.8 30.9 30.6 30.5
(6.52) (7.88) (6.11) (5.41) (6.78)
Men’s tertiary education dummy 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02
(0.21 (0.14) (0.00) (0.16) (0.15)
Women’s tertiary education dummy 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.06
(0.15) (0.27) (0.22) (0.31) (0.24)
Proportion of male children 0.40 0.58 0.54 0.54 0.51
(0.49) (0.37) (0.32) (0.26) (0.39)
Average age of children 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.5 6.1
(3.86) (2.60) (2.31) (1.57) (2.86)
Rural household dummy 0.38 0.47 0.59 0.51 0.48
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.50)
Weekly expenditure (J$) 6,480.40 6,886.88 7,040.99 6,001.10 6,868.08
(6347.86) (3431.00) (4129.70) (3500.40) (3686.95)
Budget Shares
Adult’s clothing and footwear 0.055 0.062 0.058 0.047 0.057
(0.033) (0.042) (0.034) (0.029) (0.037)
Children’s clothing and footwear 0.032 0.045 0.059 0.055 0.046
(0.021) (0.031) (0.036) (0.030) (0.031)
Food 0.497 0.537 0.566 0.624 0.543
(0.168) (0.145) (0.174) (0.130) (0.162)
Housing 0.128 0.086 0.075 0.069 0.093
(0.147) (0.094) (0.089) (0.084) (0.112)
Transportation and communication 0.115 0.107 0.091 0.086 0.103
(0.096) (0.100) (0.093) (0.069) (0.094)
Health 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.011 0.017
(0.024) (0.031) (0.021) (0.012) (0.025)
Education 0.038 0.035 0.035 0.041 0.037
(0.037) (0.048) (0.040) (0.050) (0.043)
Vices 0.020 0.007 0.012 0.011 0.013
(0.041) (0.015) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032)
Sample size 48 62 50 24 159
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Appendix 3.B Baseline Model and Model Including Mundlak terms
Table 3.B.1: Resource Share Estimates - Baseline Model and Model including Mundlak Terms
Male-headed Households Female-headed Households Single-mother Households
Household Individual With Mundlak Baseline With Mundlak Baseline With Mundlak Baseline
characteristic type terms model terms model terms model
One child adults 0.688*** 0.676*** 0.479*** 0.480*** 0.441*** 0.482***
children 0.312*** 0.324*** 0.521*** 0.519*** 0.559*** 0.518***
each child 0.312*** 0.324*** 0.521*** 0.519*** 0.559*** 0.518***
Two children adults 0.636*** 0.603*** 0.416*** 0.405*** 0.412*** 0.455***
children 0.364*** 0.397*** 0.584*** 0.595*** 0.588*** 0.545***
each child 0.182*** 0.199*** 0.292*** 0.298*** 0.294*** 0.273***
Three children adults 0.594*** 0.581*** 0.416*** 0.393*** 0.410*** 0.444***
children 0.406*** 0.419*** 0.584*** 0.607*** 0.590*** 0.556***
each child 0.135*** 0.140*** 0.195*** 0.202*** 0.197*** 0.185***
Four children adults 0.684*** 0.670*** 0.261*** 0.219** 0.150 0.182*
children 0.316*** 0.330*** 0.739*** 0.781*** 0.850*** 0.818***
each child 0.079*** 0.083*** 0.185*** 0.195*** 0.213*** 0.205***
Other urban adults -0.081** -0.094** -0.109*** -0.096** -0.147*** -0.121***
areas children 0.081** 0.094** 0.109*** 0.096** 0.147*** 0.121***
Rural areas adults -0.144*** -0.136*** -0.082** -0.087* -0.117** -0.112**
children 0.144*** 0.136*** 0.082** 0.087* 0.117** 0.112**
Man’s age adults -0.023*** -0.005** - - - -
children 0.023*** 0.005** - - - -
Woman’s age adults 0.012 0.006*** -0.019 0.003 -0.009 0.002
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children -0.012 -0.006*** 0.019 -0.003 0.009 -0.002
Minimum age adults 0.038** 0.008 0.021* 0.005 0.020 0.013*
of children children -0.038** -0.008 -0.021* -0.005 -0.020 -0.013*
Number of children adults 0.119** 0.090*** 0.188*** 0.104** 0.229*** 0.127**
< 3years old children -0.119** -0.090*** -0.188*** -0.104** -0.229*** -0.127**
Proportion of adults 0.103 -0.021 -0.152* -0.029 -0.194** -0.068*
male children children -0.103 0.021 0.152* 0.029 0.194** 0.068*
Man completed tertiary adults -0.113* -0.115** - - - -
education children 0.113* 0.115** - - - -
Woman completed tertiary adults 0.033 0.056 0.249*** 0.249*** 0.211*** 0.218***
education children -0.033 -0.056 -0.249*** -0.249*** -0.211*** -0.218***
Support from others (incl adults -0.003 -0.018 -0.062 0.031 -0.094** 0.030
remittances children 0.003 0.018 0.062 0.031 0.094** -0.030
Public assistance adults -0.167* -0.009 0.001 -0.065 0.005 -0.077
children 0.167* 0.009 -0.001 0.065 -0.005 0.077
Partner present in adults - - 0.170*** 0.049 - -
FHH children - - -0.170*** -0.049 - -
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Appendix 3.C Estimated Resource Shares - Complete




characteristic type Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr
One child adults 0.688*** 0.083 0.479*** 0.069 0.441*** 0.068
children 0.312*** 0.083 0.521*** 0.069 0.559*** 0.068
each child 0.312*** 0.083 0.521*** 0.069 0.559*** 0.068
Two children adults 0.636*** 0.086 0.416*** 0.073 0.412*** 0.076
children 0.364*** 0.086 0.584*** 0.073 0.588*** 0.076
each child 0.182*** 0.043 0.292*** 0.035 0.294*** 0.038
Three children adults 0.594*** 0.085 0.416*** 0.090 0.410*** 0.088
children 0.406*** 0.085 0.584*** 0.090 0.590*** 0.088
each child 0.135*** 0.028 0.195*** 0.030 0.197*** 0.029
Four children adults 0.684*** 0.105 0.261*** 0.098 0.150 0.105
children 0.316*** 0.105 0.739*** 0.098 0.850*** 0.105
each child 0.079*** 0.026 0.185*** 0.025 0.213*** 0.026
Other urban adults -0.081** 0.038 -0.109*** 0.039 -0.147*** 0.049
areas children 0.081** 0.038 0.109*** 0.039 0.147*** 0.049
Rural areas adults -0.144*** 0.032 -0.082** 0.041 -0.117** 0.048
children 0.144*** 0.032 0.082** 0.041 0.117** 0.048
Man’s age adults -0.023*** 0.006 - - - -
children 0.023*** 0.006 - - - -
Woman’s age adults 0.012 0.007 -0.019 0.017 -0.009 0.018
children -0.012 0.007 0.019 0.017 0.009 0.018
Minimum age adults 0.038** 0.017 0.021* 0.011 0.020 0.015
of children children -0.038** 0.017 -0.021* 0.011 -0.020 0.015
Number of children adults 0.119** 0.054 0.188*** 0.068 0.229*** 0.067
< 3years old children -0.119** 0.054 -0.188*** 0.068 -0.229*** 0.067
Proportion of adults 0.103 0.110 -0.152* 0.086 -0.194** 0.089
male children children -0.103 0.110 0.152* 0.086 0.194** 0.089
Man completed adults -0.113* 0.063 - - - -
tertiary education children 0.113* 0.063 - - - -
Woman completed adults 0.033 0.071 0.249*** 0.055 0.211*** 0.065
tertiary education children -0.033 0.071 -0.249*** 0.055 -0.211*** 0.065
Support from others adults -0.003 0.035 -0.062 0.038 -0.094** 0.043
(incl remittances) children 0.003 0.035 0.062 0.038 0.094** 0.043
Public assistance adults -0.167* 0.091 0.001 0.087 0.005 0.085
children 0.167* 0.091 -0.001 0.087 -0.005 0.085
Partner present in adults - - 0.170*** 0.063 - -
FHH children - - -0.170*** 0.063 - -
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Appendix 3.D Average Resource Shares
Table 3.D.1: Average Resource Shares by Household Type
Male-headed Female-headed Single-mother
Households Households Households
Household Individual Standard Standard Standard
type type Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
One child adults 0.608 0.093 0.598 0.084 0.591 0.129
children 0.392 0.093 0.402 0.084 0.409 0.129
each child 0.392 0.093 0.402 0.084 0.409 0.129
Two children adults 0.569 0.096 0.554 0.116 0.546 0.107
children 0.431 0.096 0.446 0.116 0.454 0.107
each child 0.215 0.048 0.223 0.058 0.227 0.054
Three children adults 0.521 0.091 0.537 0.104 0.522 0.132
children 0.479 0.091 0.463 0.104 0.478 0.132
each child 0.160 0.030 0.154 0.035 0.159 0.044
Four children adults 0.646 0.098 0.400 0.138 0.281 0.105
children 0.354 0.098 0.600 0.138 0.719 0.105
each child 0.089 0.025 0.150 0.0.035 0.180 0.026
All households adults 0.583 0.100 0.544 0.122 0.549 0.137
children 0.417 0.100 0.456 0.122 0.451 0.137
each child 0.267 0.127 0.248 0.118 0.295 0.140
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Chapter 4
Child Fostering and the Educational
Outcomes of Jamaican Children
Abstract
The practice of informal fostering is prevalent in many developing regions of the world.
This study investigates the effects of this practice on educational outcomes in Jamaica using a
rotating panel data set of children constructed from six rounds of the Jamaican Survey of Living
Conditions. Using panel data allow us to deal more effectively with the problem of endogeneity
by applying household and child fixed effects. In addition to estimating the ‘short-term’ effects
of fostering on education in terms of school attendance, we are also able to investigate if any
‘long-term’ effects exist using the number of years of schooling. Our findings indicate that
the effect of fostering on the number of schooling years completed depends on whether the
household is a beneficiary of PATH, a conditional cash-transfer programme instituted by the
Government of Jamaica in 2001. We show that a foster child that lives within a household
that benefits from PATH completes more years of schooling than a foster child who does not,
even though generally, biological children tend to accumulate more years of schooling than their
foster siblings. With respect to the short-term effects, we find that being a foster child in itself
has no direct effect on school attendance in Jamaica.
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4.1 Introduction
The practice of informal fostering whereby children with at least one living parent live with
extended family members or even friends is prevalent in developing regions such as Africa and
the Caribbean. Zimmerman (2003) estimates that 25% of children living in developing countries
are fostered for different periods of time, ranging from one year to several years at a time.
The characteristics of this practice differ from country to country and may even differ among
different ethnic groups within the same country (Isiugo-Abanihe, 1985). More importantly,
although fostering may benefit the families involved by strengthening kinship ties and social
bonds (Serra, 2009), children may be worse off in households where both of their parents
are absent. According to Hamilton (1964), individuals tend to be more altruistic towards
one another the more closely they are related, implying that the welfare of foster children
may generally be lower than that of biological children within the same household. This line
of reasoning together with the high incidence of fostering in poorer regions has stimulated
research on the effects of fostering on domestic labour (Ainsworth, 1996), health (Taiwo, 2012),
and the educational outcomes (Akresh, 2004) of children involved in this practice. Education,
in particular, has long-term implications for the welfare of any individual as it is known to
affect future health and labour outcomes (Currie and Thomas, 1999).
In this study, we are able to construct a rotating panel of children from the 2004, 2006, 2007,
2008, 2009, and 2010 rounds of the Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions (JSLC hereafter)
enabling us to follow children within the same household for a minimum of two years and a
maximum of four years. This means that our panel captures fostering that occurs as a result
of the relocation of parents and not children, a phenomenon that is quite common in Jamaica
and the Caribbean (Stephenson and Wilsker, 2016). More importantly, the panel data set
allows us to control for unobserved household and child characteristics that are constant over
time. This is important as some of these omitted variables (such as a household’s network
quality and a child’s ability) are likely to be correlated with the fostering variable, making it
endogenous. Hence, by applying household and child fixed effects, we are able to deal more
effectively with the problem of endogeneity with respect to our variable of interest and within
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our model as a whole. Moreover, most of the research available on the effects of fostering
on child welfare use cross-sectional data making it highly probable that estimates from these
papers are biased. The only exceptions are Akresh (2004) and Cichello (2003) who investigate
fostering decisions in Burkina Faso and South Africa respectively. However, these studies apply
fixed effects estimation methods to very short panels consisting of only two periods.
It is also a fact that the majority of studies on informal child fostering focus specifically on
African countries. This apparent scarcity of economic literature on fostering in other developing
regions, such as the Caribbean, could be due to the absence of data sets that are appropriate for
this kind of research. This essay contributes to the literature by focusing on Jamaica, an island
country in the Caribbean where child fostering rates are as high as they are in many African
countries. According to Wyss (1995), about 20% of children in Jamaica live apart from both of
their parents. It is also worth mentioning that the reasons for fostering generally differ between
Africa and the Caribbean, and hence the effects of this practice could be different for the two
regions. Previous sociological studies on household structure in the Caribbean such as Goody
(1975), Sanford (1975), and Russell-Brown et al. (1997) show that due to the unconventional
mating and residential patterns that are characteristic of the region, fostering is usually a
result of teenage childbearing, the breakdown of non-residential unions, and the migration of
parents to find better jobs. Conversely, African children relocate from their natal homes for
better education, an apprenticeship, and to reallocate domestic labour and share risk between
households (Isiugo-Abanihe, 1985). In other words, while crisis fostering is predominant in the
Caribbean, purposive fostering tends to be more prevalent in Africa.
The only other study which looks at the economic effects of fostering within the Caribbean
is Gibbison and Paul (2005). Using cross-sectional data from the 1990 round of the JSLC,
they also attempt to estimate the effects of fostering on the educational outcomes of Jamaican
children. Similar to our study, they measure the effect of foster care arrangements on primary
school children’s access to education using school attendance variables. They also investigate
the relationship between child fostering and the educational achievements of students focusing
on a test on reading comprehension and mathematics taken by each child. Their results indicate
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that foster boys in particular are generally more likely to have lower educational outcomes.
Our study differs from Gibbison and Paul (2005) in at least three ways. First, apart from
capturing the ‘short-term’ effect of fostering using the school attendance variable, our data set
enables us to use the total number of years of schooling to capture the ‘long-term’ effect as well.
In fact, most of the fostering literature on education measure educational achievements using
some sort of test (like Gibbison and Paul (2005)) or school enrolment rates as at least one of
these variables is usually available within most standard household surveys. Zimmerman (2003),
Marazyan (2015a), Marazyan (2015b), and Hampshire et al. (2015) are other examples of such
papers.1 While school enrolment and attendance provide some indication of schooling effort
within a particular period of time, it does not necessarily mean that human capital accumulation
is taking place since school drop-out rates and class repetition are quite common in developing
countries (Anderson et al., 2001; Cichello, 2003). In the present essay, we argue that despite
its weaknesses (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008), the number of years of schooling is a better
proxy for human capital accumulation for our context and hence gives better estimates of the
long-term effects of fostering on a child’s educational attainment. Second, our sample is larger
and consists of children in preschool, primary school and secondary school. Third, as previously
indicated, the panel structure of our data set allows us to deal more effectively with endogeneity
through the use of household and child fixed effects. Indeed, in our study, applying fixed effects
estimation methods significantly changes the results. This indicates that controlling for these
time-invariant household and child characteristics is important. Moreover, using a more recent
data set makes our findings more relevant for present-day policy.
With regard to the short-term effects, we find that being a foster child in itself does not
have any significant direct effects on school attendance. As expected, the results show that
children in households who are beneficiaries of the Programme of Advancement through Health
and Education (PATH hereafter), a conditional cash-transfer programme instituted by the
Government of Jamaica in 2001, are less likely to be absent from school. This result is not
surprising since regular school attendance is one of the conditions that must be met before
1 A notable exception to this trend is Cichello (2003) who constructs and uses some kind of school progress
variable for the Kwa-Zulu region of South Africa.
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cash transfers are sent to households. Nonetheless, it seems that this positive effect of PATH
applies more strongly to biological children than to foster children. Our results also indicate
that children in households that own their houses or receive support from parents who live
elsewhere are less likely to be absent from school. Contrary to this, children in households that
receive remittances and windfall receipts tend to be absent from school more often than those
who do not.
In terms of the long-term effects of fostering, our findings indicate that foster children tend
to complete fewer years of schooling compared to biological children within the same household.
However, this effect tends to depend on whether the household is a beneficiary of PATH. We
show that a foster child that lives within a household that benefits from PATH completes more
years of schooling than a foster child who does not. In fact, a foster child in a household that
benefits from PATH completes only 0.15% less schooling years than a biological child in a non-
PATH household which corresponds to only about a week of school within this sample. This is
encouraging as higher educational attainment is one of the long-term goals of PATH (Levy and
Ohls, 2003, 2010). Our results also show that children who live in single-mother households
tend to have more years of schooling compared to the other household types. Single mothers
may be investing more in the education of their children as a means of insuring their own future
incomes as it is common practice in Jamaica for children to take care of their parents (especially
their mothers) as they get older (Handa, 1996a,c; Sargent and Harris, 1992).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we provide a brief review
of the child fostering literature. Section 4.3 describes our data set, presents some summary
statistics and discusses the empirical methods we use in estimating our models. In Section 4.4,
we present and discuss our main results while Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 A Review of the Fostering Literature
Early work on child fostering began in the 1960s and was carried out mostly within other
social science disciplines including demography, sociology, and anthropology. These studies
were mostly descriptive and focused on various countries and regions. For example, Ainsworth
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(1967) describes fostering in Uganda, while Goody (1973) and Fiawoo (1978) focus on kinship
fostering in Ghana. Other work on Africa include Goody (1982), Isiugo-Abanihe (1985), Bledsoe
and Isiugo-Abanihe (1989), and Bledsoe (1990). Sanford (1975) and Goody (1975) carry out
sociological studies of fostering within the Caribbean, while Paul (1963) and Keesing (1970)
provide an anthropological perspective of the practice within Oceania.
Within the economics literature, studies on child fostering can be divided into two broad
categories. The first category of studies investigates the motives or reasons for fostering while
the second examines the effects of fostering on various welfare outcomes. The first economic
model that examines both demand and supply sides of the fostering market is developed by
Ainsworth (1996) using data from Côte d’Ivoire. The results of this study generally support
the domestic labour motive of fostering, where children are sent to other households to carry
out domestic tasks such as household chores and child minding. Zimmerman (2003) and
Akresh (2009) have since further developed the Ainsworth (1996) model and found evidence
for educational and risk-coping motives respectively. Serra (2009) also shows that labour and
schooling motives could coexist within the same context while recent work on Malawi by Grant
and Yeatman (2014) indicates that divorce and remarriage could also be an important reason
for sending children away from their natal homes.
The majority of papers that investigate the effects of fostering on child welfare focus
particularly on educational outcomes. So far, no consensus has been reached with regard to
foster children or host children since results are largely mixed for both groups. Akresh (2004)
finds that relative to children from non-fostering households, children from fostering households
are more likely to be enrolled in school in Burkina Faso. Similarly, using cross-sectional data,
Zimmerman (2003) and Eloundou-Enyegue and Shapiro (2004) find that fostering improves
the school enrolment rates of foster children in South Africa and Cameroon, respectively. In
contrast, the results of Kielland (2010) and Gibbison and Paul (2005) show that foster children
are likely to be worse off in terms of educational outcomes, while Cichello (2003) and Penglase
(2017) find no significant differences in educational outcomes between foster children and non-
foster children. One can therefore conclude that both the motives and effects of child fostering
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depend largely on context and the specific country or region in question.
As already indicated, with a few exceptions, these papers tend to use cross-sectional data
sets from Africa and use school enrolment rates as the outcome variable. Our study diverts from
this trend by applying child and household fixed effects in estimating the effects of fostering on
the number of schooling years a child has completed as opposed to whether he or she is enrolled
in school. We also examine a region that has been ignored in most of the literature.
4.3 Empirical Implementation
This section is divided into two parts. We discuss our data set and present summary
statistics in the first part of the section. The second subsection explains the estimation
techniques used and the specification of our regression models.
4.3.1 Data Set
This essay makes use of the same household survey used in Chapter 3. The Jamaican Survey
of Living Conditions (JSLC) is a nation-wide survey that collects data on the living standards
of households. It is an important tool used by the government to monitor the country’s socio-
economic development. The survey began in 1988 and has since been fielded at least once a
year except in 2011 when no data were collected. The core modules of the JSLC include health,
education, consumption, housing, and social protection. Occasionally, other modules such as
youth employment, migration, coping strategies, and remittances are also included within the
survey.
As previously mentioned, the JSLC is a subset of a larger survey known as the Labour
Force Survey (LFS hereafter). The sampling process for the LFS, and by extension, the JSLC,
is done using a one-half panel design where some of the households are followed from two to
four consecutive years. Similar to Chapter 3, we take advantage of this one-half panel design
to create a panel of households for the following years: 2004-2006 and 2007-2010.2 Using the
2We are unable to use data from the 2005 round because the heath, education, and housing modules are
not fielded in that year.
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exact same technique (that is, Handa’s (2008) technique) and procedure used in Chapter 3, we
create a unique household identifier to match households across different rounds of the JSLC.
Next, from this sample of matched households, we follow a similar procedure to match the
children in each household across different rounds of the JSLC with a match rate of 67%. Before
a unique child identifier is created, we verify that the gender of the child and his/her relation
to the household head remain the same. We also confirm that the child’s age did not change
by more than 2 years. The final sample consists of children between the ages of 2 and 18 who
are either preschoolers, enrolled in primary or secondary school. We exclude married teenagers
which make up less than 1% of the sample. The sample consists of 1,507 children and 3,794
observations, meaning that on average, a child is followed for at least 2 years. We also use
monthly Consumer Price Indices from the Bank of Jamaica to deflate all monetary values with
December 2006 as the base value.
With regard to the foster child variable in particular, we are able to follow the foster
children whose parents relocate but not those children who move from their natal homes to
different households as our data set allows us to match only the children who stay within the
same household. To confirm that our final sample captures the nature of child fostering in
Jamaica reasonably well, we include all the children who are not included in the panel sample
(probably because they move from one household to another) and run a probit model that
shows whether the foster child variable predicts inclusion in the final sample. We control for
other individual child characteristics, household characteristics, characteristics of the household
head, and community characteristics. These results (presented in Appendix 4.A) show that
foster child is statistically insignificant and hence does not predict inclusion in the final sample.
This provides some secondary evidence of the absence of significant sample selection bias in our
final sample, especially with regard to our variable of interest.
Previous studies such as Russell-Brown et al. (1997) and Lloyd and Desai (1992) have defined
a foster child as a child living apart from his mother only, because, especially in the Caribbean,
mothers have generally been known to take more interest in the welfare of their children than
fathers (Clarke, 1999). This is probably due to the matrifocal nature of the society and the fact
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that the responsibility of physically caring for children naturally tends to fall more on mothers
than on fathers. However, Gibbison (2000) and Morrell et al. (2003) provide some evidence that
indicates that fathers take as much interest in their children as mothers. We also test this in
the present study and find that the presence of the father, even more than the mother, increases
the number of schooling years accumulated by the child and his/her attendance to school. This
may reflect the fact that the father, once he is present, is more likely to be the parent paying
for the child’s education. See Appendix 4.B for these results. Hence, we define a foster child in
our context as a child who is living apart from both biological parents. A biological child, on
the other hand, is defined as a child living with at least one biological parent. The JSLC, for
the periods of our sample, consistently collects information on whether the individuals within
the household who play the role of father and mother are actually the child’s birth parents.
We process this information to determine whether a child is a foster child or a biological child.
The rate of child fostering within our sample is 22%, which is quite high when compared to
the rates in other West African countries. Akresh (2009), for instance, reports that 15% of the
children in Burkina Faso and Ghana are fostered while Marazyan (2015b) reports a fostering
rate of 8.5% in Senegal.
The JSLC also consistently collects information on the education of each child. First, we
are able to determine the number of days a child is sent to school within a four-week period.
We process this information to generate our first outcome variable - the number of days a child
is present in school. Information is also collected on the reasons for absence including illness,
money problems, and bad weather. This enables us to account for the days that children are
absent from school because of illness. Second, the JSLC also collects information on what
type of school each child is currently enrolled in, that is, preschool, primary school, secondary
school, or a tertiary institution. In addition to this, the JSLC also collects information on the
particular grade each child is currently in. We process information from these two variables to
generate our second outcome variable - the number of years of schooling. In particular, we are
able to calculate the number of years of schooling using the particular grade a child is in and
not just the level of education. This means that we are able to differentiate between a child who
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completes primary school and one that drops out in the middle of primary school for instance.
We also assign one year to each grade irrespective of whether the child repeats a grade or not.
Hence, a child who has been in school for a longer period of time because of grade repetition
does not have more years of schooling than a child who does not repeat any grade.
We are also able to determine whether a household is a beneficiary of the PATH programme
as the JSLC collects information on how long a household has been in receipt of PATH. As
already mentioned, PATH is a conditional cash transfer program aimed at promoting the
development of human capital by providing health and education grants to eligible households.
This programme was designed to replace former social protection programmes such as the
food stamps, poor relief, and public assistance. The programme’s benefits are conditioned on
meeting certain requirements in the short-term including attendance to school and health visits.
Eligibility for PATH is determined by a proxy-means test undertaken by the Planning Institute
of Jamaica. This test is based primarily on household expenditure and income which we also
control for in our model using per-capita expenditure and the assets owned by the household. To
carry out the test, potential beneficiaries of the programme are asked to submit information on
variables which are strongly related to income and expenditure such as household demographics,
dwelling characteristics, and education (Overseas Development Institute, 2006). According to
Levy and Ohls (2010), targeting for PATH is quite effective and may even be better than that
of similar programmes such as PROGRESA in Mexico. For example, their study shows that
while 63% of PATH beneficiaries fall within the 25th percentile of consumption, only 39% of
PROGRESA beneficiaries fall within the same percentile.
Finally, our data set allows us to generate other child-specific variables including a child’s
age; whether the child walks to school; whether the child attends a public school; and whether
the child has a chronic disease. We also create other household-specific variables including
whether the household owns their home, a television set, and a radio; whether the source
of power in the household is electricity; whether the household receives payments specifically
to support the children; whether the household receives remittances, property income or any
windfall income; the per-capita household expenditure; the number of adults and preschoolers
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in the household; the sex ratio of biological children; the proportion of boys; and finally, whether
the household includes extended family members. We also control for the characteristics of the
household head including age; whether they have completed tertiary education; and whether
they have a chronic disease. The gender and marital status of the household head are also
controlled for by indicating whether the head is a single mother, partnered female, single father,
or partnered male (reference variable). Lastly, we include community characteristics such as
the region (Kingston Metropolitan Area, other urban areas, and rural areas) and the distance
to the nearest primary and secondary schools.
Summary statistics are presented according to fostering status in Table 4.1. In the last
column of the table, we carry out tests for the difference in means between foster children and
biological children. The following focuses on the variables which are found to have statistically
different means for each group. First, Jamaican foster children tend to be older than their non-
foster siblings on average. This is a common finding in the literature as fostering rates tend
to increase with age (Cichello, 2003; Penglase, 2017). We also note that generally, children are
more likely to live with their mothers than their fathers.
With regard to household characteristics, foster children are more likely to be found in
extended family households. This is not surprising because, according to Goody (1975), the
grandmother is the most important foster parent within the Caribbean. Also, children within
our sample are more likely to be fostered in female-headed households, especially those headed
by a single mother. In addition, Table 4.1 shows that fostering households are more likely to
receive remittances and other monetary support for the children. They are also more likely on
average to be located in a rural area and to be registered on the PATH programme, and less
likely to own their home or dwelling.
4.3.2 Model Specification and Estimation Method
We exploit the panel structure of our data set by running fixed effects estimations. This
enables us to better control for the endogeneity of our variable of interest by accounting for
unobserved household characteristics (such as the quality of a household’s network) and child
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Sample by Fostering Status
Characteristics Biological children Foster children Difference
Child Characteristics
Age 9.3 12.7 -3.4***
(3.09) (3.98) (0.13)
Gender (1=male) 0.49 0.48 0.01
(0.50) (0.50) (0.02)
Mother present 0.93 - -
(0.26)
Father present 0.50 - -
(0.50)
Years of schooling 7.03 10.16 -3.12***
(2.81) (3.65) (0.12)
Days present (out of 20 days) 19.25 19.20 0.04
(2.16) (2.18) (0.10)
Household Characteristics
Log of per capita household expenditure 11.48 11.44 0.03
(0.66) 0.61) (0.03)
Extended family 0.37 0.71 -0.34***
(0.49) (0.45) (0.02)
Owns house 0.36 0.22 -0.14***
(0.48) (0.42) (0.02)
Owns a radio 0.78 0.79 -0.01
(0.41) (0.41) (0.02))
Owns a television 0.90 0.91 -0.01
(0.30) (0.29) (0.01)
Receives support for children 0.30 0.46 -0.16***
(0.46) (0.50) (0.02)
Receives remittances 0.36 0.45 -0.09***
(0.48) (0.50) (0.02)
Receives rental income 0.01 0.01 -0.001
(0.10) (0.10) (0.004)
Windfall receipts 0.04 0.05 -0.01
(0.20) 0.23) (0.01)
PATH beneficiary 0.33 0.38 -0.05**
(0.47) (0.48) (0.02)
Female-headed household 0.52 0.63 -0.11***
(0.50) (0.48) (0.02)
Single-mother household 0.38 0.50 -0.11***
(0.49) (0.50) (0.02)
Rural household 0.52 0.62 -0.10***
(0.50) (0.49) (0.02)
Sample size 2,969 825 -
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Null hypothesis for the differences in means test is that the means are statistically equal.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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characteristics (such as the child’s ability and enrolment history) which are constant over time.
Since our panel data set is created by following each child within the same household, our
identifying assumption is that there are no other time-varying factors that are correlated with
parents moving out of or moving back into the household. Although we attempt to control for
variables that may cause this assumption to be violated (such as per-capita consumption levels,
the level of education of the household head, and the different sources from which a household
may receive income), it is possible that due to data restrictions, we have not been able to cover
all the time-varying factors that could be correlated with the fostering variable. If this is true,
our results may also reflect the crisis that precipitated the fostering in the first place.
With regard to the foster child variable in particular, we have three categories of children
within our data set - biological children who remain biological children for the whole panel, foster
children who remain foster children for the whole panel, and biological children who become
foster children or foster children who become biological children because of the relocation of
parents. This means that our fixed effects estimation essentially captures the variation in
educational outcomes within a panel for the last category of children whose fostering status
change within a panel because their parents move out of or back into the household. While this
means that we are only able to explain the effects of fostering that result from the relocation
of parents and not children, an important advantage that this scenario creates is the ability
to compare the same child as a biological child and a foster child. Moreover, as previously
indicated, this kind of fostering which results from parents moving out of the household is
characteristic of Jamaica and the Caribbean region in general (Safa, 2007). Teenage girls, for
instance, may leave their babies with their mothers to return to school or enter the labour force
(Russell-Brown et al., 1997; Isiugo-Abanihe, 1985). Fostering may also be a way to cope with
children born out of wedlock, who are products of a transient or non-residential union, or whose
parents have divorced (Goody, 1975).
We run similar sets of regression models for two dependent variables: the number of years
of schooling and the number of days a child is present in school out of a twenty-day reference
period. The number of years of schooling model investigates the long-term or more permanent
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effects of fostering on a child’s education, while the attendance model is used to test for any
immediate or short-run effect. We look at both short-term and long-term effects because it
enables us to have a more comprehensive understanding of the subject. More importantly,
these different kinds of impact may have different policy implications and hence may require
different policy actions.
In addition to this, even though attendance shows some schooling effort, it does not
necessarily indicate the accumulation of human capital, as high drop-out rates and grade
repetition can be quite common in a developing country like Jamaica (Anderson et al., 2001).
In spite of the fact that the number of years of schooling does not capture certain aspects
of the quality of education provided (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008)3, it provides a good
indication of one’s educational progress and attainment within our context. Also, as previously
discussed, we are able to minimize the flaws of this variable by accounting for grade repetition
and drop outs. Essentially, we calculate the number of years of schooling accumulated using
the particular grade that each student is in instead of more general categories such as primary,
secondary, or tertiary levels.
We specify both regression models as follows:
Yijt = αij + β1Cijt + β2Hijt + β3Pijt + β4Aijt + β5T + uijt (4.1)
where the subscripts i, j, and t denote child, household, and year respectively. Yijt represents
the dependent variable which is either the number of years of schooling or attendance, αij
represents the child and household characteristics which are constant over time, Cijt is a vector
of individual child characteristics, Hijt is a vector of household characteristics, Pijt is a vector
of the characteristics of the household head, Aijt is a vector of community characteristics, T is
a vector of time dummies, and uijt represents the error term. All standard errors are clustered
at the household level to account for the within-household correlation that may exist between
children who live in the same household.
Since both of our dependent variables are count variables, we run both models using the
3This is true especially when international comparisons are being made.
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fixed effects Poisson model developed by Hausman et al. (1984). The coefficients can be
estimated using standard conditional maximum likelihood estimation techniques. Wooldridge
(1999) proves the robustness of this estimator by showing that it remains consistent under
very mild assumptions. His paper shows that a fully robust variance matrix estimator is still
valid under the conditional mean assumption only. Hence, although the model is made for
count data, it remains consistent if the dependent variable is a continuous variable or has both
discrete and continuous properties. The estimator also allows for arbitrary time dependence of
the dependent variable for each child. Another advantage of this estimator is the fact the results
can be interpreted using semi-elasticities. Margins are not needed to interpret the results as
the fixed effects are not actually computed (Kitazawa, 2012; Kemp and Santos Silva, 2016).
4.4 Empirical Results
In this section we discuss our main findings. The first part of the section focuses on the
short-term or immediate effects of fostering on education while the second part looks at the
more permanent long-term effects.
4.4.1 Short-term Effects
Table 4.2 presents the results of estimating Equation 4.1 for the number of days present in
school when both household and child fixed effects are applied. The difference between model
I and model II is the inclusion of an interaction term in the latter model which interacts the
foster child variable with the PATH variable. We include this interaction term to test whether
the effects of PATH on children’s educational outcomes differ based on the child’s fostering
status. Table 4.2 shows that unlike the other variables, including this interaction term changes
the magnitude and significance of both the foster child variable and the PATH variable. Our
discussion in this section focuses mainly on Model II since the interpretation of the interaction
term in particular, may have significant policy implications.
Unlike Gibbison and Paul (2005), foster children suffer no statistically significant
disadvantage in model I in terms of attendance. However, once the interaction term is included
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Table 4.2: Number of Days Present
Model I Model II
Variables Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr
Child Characteristics
Age 0.0004 0.0080 0.0005 0.0080
Age squared -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0003
Foster child 0.0125 0.0113 0.0345*** 0.0126
Attends public school 0.0052 0.0069 0.0051 0.0069
Walks to school 0.0147 0.0096 0.0147 0.0095
Has a chronic disease -0.0056 0.0089 -0.0058 0.0090
Household Characteristics
Owns home 0.0197** 0.0095 0.0189** 0.0093
Owns a radio 0.0056 0.0066 0.0062 0.0066
Owns a television set 0.0148 0.0159 0.0163 0.0159
Connected to electricity 0.0113 0.0168 0.0116 0.0169
Receives support for children 0.0192** 0.0076 0.0184** 0.0076
Receives remittances -0.0123* 0.0067 -0.0118* 0.0065
Receives rental income -0.0003 0.0154 0.0023 0.0154
Receives windfall income -0.0223** 0.0109 -0.0236** 0.0110
Number of adults 0.0070 0.0149 0.0070 0.0148
Number of preschoolers 0.0086 0.0074 0.0083 0.0074
Proportion of boys -0.0043 0.0212 -0.0043 0.0212
Sex ratio of biological children -0.0020 0.0081 -0.0016 0.0079
Extended family -0.0130 0.0126 -0.0131 0.0126
Total expenditure per capita -0.0030 0.0082 -0.0033 0.0082
PATH beneficiary 0.0177 0.0124 0.0321** 0.0127
PATH beneficiary*Foster child - - -0.0556*** 0.0155
Household Head Characteristics
Single father 0.0433 0.0310 0.0358 0.0311
Female with spouse -0.0039 0.0190 -0.0054 0.0192
Single mother -0.0168 0.0291 -0.0182 0.0291
Age 0.0029 0.0036 0.0029 0.0036
Completed tertiary education -0.0086 0.0139 -0.0084 0.0140
Has a chronic disease -0.0093 0.0086 -0.0094 0.0087
Area Characteristics
Other urban area (not KMA) 0.0005 0.0076 0.0033 0.0088
Rural area 0.0496 0.0422 0.0565 0.0453
Distance to nearest primary school 0.0001** 0.00003 0.0001** 0.00004
Distance to nearest secondary school -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
Time Dummies yes yes
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
KMA stands for Kingston Metropolitan Area
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in Model II, the coefficient on the foster child variable becomes statistically significant. The
PATH variable and the interaction term are also statistically significant in model II. This
means that although fostering by itself may not have a direct impact on a child’s school
attendance, it does have an effect through PATH. In other words, the effect that PATH has
on a child’s attendance depends on whether the child is a foster child or not. Our findings
indicate that PATH has been effective in increasing the rate of attendance of school children.
This corroborates the findings of Levy and Ohls (2010) who conduct an evaluation of PATH
on school attendance and preventive healthcare visits. Nonetheless, the results show that this
positive effect of PATH is biased towards biological children. On average, PATH increases
a biological child’s attendance by 3.21% and decreases a foster child’s attendance by 2.35%
(0.0321 - 0.0556) which corresponds to 8 and 6 days of school respectively for our sample.
In fact, a foster child in a household that receives payments from PATH is more likely to be
absent from school than a foster child who does not benefit from the programme. With school
attendance being generally high in Jamaica, this impact is quite significant. This may warrant
a re-evaluation of the administration and implementation of the programme with respect to
foster children in particular.
We will now discuss the other household characteristics that impact school attendance in
a statistically significant way. First, children in households that own their dwelling tend to be
absent from school less often. It is likely that this variable is picking up an income effect, that
is, households that own their dwelling are likely to be wealthier (this is true in our sample) and
more stable and hence make it less likely that school attendance will be hindered by financial
problems for instance (Levy and Ohls, 2003). Moreover, households that live in rented homes
are more likely to move or be evicted and hence children in such situations may have to be
absent from school during such transition periods.
We also find that support received specifically for children from parents who live in Jamaica
or abroad increase the rate of school attendance by almost 2%. According to Goody (1975), the
parents of foster children usually send money to foster parents as a way of contributing towards
the care of their children and also to earn their children’s affection and loyalty. On the other
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hand, our results show that children in households that receive remittances and windfall receipts
tend to be absent from school more often. This could be because these sources of income are
usually one-off payments, or at best, intermittent. In the case of remittances, for example,
money may only be sent at the beginning of the academic year. The lack of steady income
may cause a higher rate of absence from school since non-attendance is usually attributed to
money problems (Levy and Ohls, 2003). Moreover, since most of these payments are not sent
specifically to cater to the needs of the children in the household, other household members are
likely to compete for these resources (Gibbison and Paul, 2005; Duflo, 2003).
Lastly, we investigate our results further by estimating Equation 4.1 applying household
fixed effects only. We present these results in Appendix 4.C. A comparison of these results
with Table 4.2 shows that the results for school attendance are driven mostly by household
fixed effects and not child fixed effects. In other words, school attendance is influenced highly
by household characteristics which may be unobserved and not by child-specific characteristics
per se.
4.4.2 Long-term Effects
We will now discuss the results of estimating Equation 4.1 for the number of years of
schooling when both household and child fixed effects are applied. We present these results
in Table 4.3. Similar to Table 4.2, this table presents 2 models where model II includes an
interaction term of the foster child and PATH variables. Again, this is one way to test if PATH
has a long-run effect on human capital accumulation and if this effect depends on whether the
child is fostered or not. Similar to the attendance equations in Subsection 4.4.1, the inclusion
of this interaction term affects the magnitudes and significance of both the foster child and
PATH variables.
This time, the coefficient of foster child is negative and 10% significant in model I with a p-
value of 0.064. Hence, being a foster child in itself seems to have a negative effect on the number
of schooling years accumulated although this impact is not highly significant. Nonetheless, once
the interaction term is included in model II, the foster child variable, along with the interaction
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Table 4.3: Number of Years of Schooling
Model I Model II
Variables Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr
Child Characteristics
Age 0.1494*** 0.0087 0.1495*** 0.0087
Age squared -0.0039*** 0.0003 -0.0039*** 0.0003
Foster child -0.0145* 0.0078 -0.0257*** 0.0082
Attends public school 0.0225** 0.0102 0.0227** 0.0102
Walks to school -0.0054 0.0062 -0.0054 0.0062
Has a chronic disease 0.0096 0.0081 0.0097 0.0082
Household Characteristics
Owns home 0.0043 0.0084 0.0049 0.0084
Owns a radio -0.0086* 0.0047 -0.0089* 0.0047
Owns a television set 0.0180** 0.0086 0.0173** 0.0085
Connected to electricity -0.0142 0.0118 -0.0142 0.0119
Receives support for children 0.0003 0.0050 0.0006 0.0049
Receives remittances 0.0040 0.0050 0.0038 0.0049
Receives rental income -0.0362** 0.0135 -0.0374*** 0.0135
Receives windfall income 0.0109 0.0069 0.0115* 0.0069
Number of adults 0.0072 0.0108 0.0073 0.0107
Number of preschoolers -0.0009 0.0061 -0.0007 0.0061
Proportion of boys -0.0195 0.0185 -0.0195 0.0185
Sex ratio of biological children 0.0039 0.0067 0.0036 0.0066
Extended family -0.0055 0.0086 -0.0056 0.0086
Total expenditure per capita -0.0019 0.0053 -0.0018 0.0053
PATH beneficiary 0.0051 0.0086 -0.0045 0.0096
PATH beneficiary*Foster child - - 0.0287*** 0.0100
Household Head Characteristics
Single father -0.0021 0.0224 0.0010 0.0228
Female with spouse 0.0249 0.0175 0.0260 0.0176
Single mother 0.0511** 0.0243 0.0522** 0.0243
Age -0.0041 0.0027 -0.0042 0.0027
Completed tertiary education -0.0125 0.0094 -0.0127 0.0094
Has a chronic disease 0.0022 0.0055 0.0022 0.0055
Area Characteristics
Other urban area (not KMA) -0.0320 0.0676 -0.0335 0.0675
Rural area 0.0167 0.0726 0.0110 0.0718
Distance to nearest primary school 0.0003*** 0.00003 0.0002*** 0.00004
Distance to nearest secondary school 0.0002*** 0.00003 -0.0002*** 0.00003
Time Dummies yes yes
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
KMA stands for Kingston Metropolitan Area
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term, becomes statistically significant at 1%. This means that the impact that being a foster
child has on the number of years of schooling accumulated depends on whether the child has
access to PATH or not. First and foremost, it is important to note that our findings in model II
indicate that generally, biological children tend to accumulate more years of schooling than their
foster counterparts. In particular, foster children with no access to PATH accumulate 2.57%
less schooling years. This is equivalent to about 10 weeks of school within our sample. A foster
child with access to PATH, on the other hand, tends to accumulate 0.3% (- 0.0257 + 0.0287)
more years of schooling than a biological child with access to PATH. This corresponds to only
8 days in our sample. Although these results may seem modest, they show that PATH could
indirectly impact the long-term educational outcomes of foster children positively despite the
fact that the programme has no direct effect by itself (PATH remains statistically insignificant
in model I and II). This is quite encouraging since one of the main objectives of PATH is to
improve the quality of human capital in Jamaica.
Model II also shows that the nature of the headship of the household significantly affects the
number of years of schooling completed by the children within that household. In particular,
children in single-mother households complete 5.22% more years of schooling corresponding to
about 21 weeks within our sample. In a matrifocal society like Jamaica’s (Safa, 2007), single
mothers tend to invest highly in their children’s education to ensure a steady flow of income
in their old age. Moreover, children in the Caribbean are known to take care of their elderly
parents, especially their mothers (Handa, 1996a; Wyss, 1999; Handa, 1996c).
We also find that children in households that receive rental or property income complete
less years of schooling. Unlike single mothers, adults in these households may be investing
less in their children’s education if they expect to continue to receive this income in their old
age. In contrast to this, our findings show that children in households that receive windfall
income complete more years of schooling. This may indicate that households tend to invest
at least a portion of the windfall income they receive in the education of the children within
the household. Unlike school attendance, the support received by the household from parents
living elsewhere does not seem to have any significant long-term effect on the education of the
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children. Our results also indicate that children who attend public schools tend to complete
more years of schooling. This is probably because in Jamaica, almost all secondary schools are
public while a good number of private primary schools exist.
Other variables that affect the number of years accumulated include owning a radio or a
television set. Children in households that own a radio tend to complete less years of schooling.
The opposite is true for children in households that own a television set. First, these variables
may be picking up an income effect since television sets are generally more expensive than
radios. Second, while both of these variables indicate access to information, a radio is likely
to make available localized information while a television set could potentially provide more
complex world-wide information. Hence, a household that uses a television as its primary
source of information and for entertainment may indicate that the parents or guardians in that
household, apart from being wealthier, are also relatively more educated (Handa, 1999). This
could explain why children in such households tend to complete more years of education.
Similar to Subsection 4.4.1, we investigate our results further by estimating Equation 4.1
applying household fixed effects only. Our results presented in Appendix 4.C show that both
child and household fixed effects are important for our results since controlling for unobserved
household characteristics only affects either the magnitude, sign, or significance of most of the
coefficients. Therefore, we can conclude that this long-term educational outcome is driven by
both household and child time-constant characteristics which are unobserved.
4.5 Conclusion
Informal child fostering is a common practice in most developing countries, especially within
Africa and the Caribbean. This study investigates the relationship between this practice and
the educational outcomes of Jamaican children. We are able to construct a rotating panel
of children from the 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 rounds of the Jamaican Survey
of Living Conditions using unique household and child identifiers. Using a panel data set
enables us to better control for the endogeneity of the foster child variable by controlling
for unobservable household and child characteristics that are constant over time. Most similar
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papers use educational outcome variables such as school enrolment and attendance. While these
variables are good measures of access to education, we argue that they are not good measures
of human capital development. Apart from school attendance, we include the number of years
of schooling as an educational outcome variable to measure the long-term effects of fostering
on education. In addition to this, we are able to minimize the weaknesses of this variable by
accounting for drop outs and grade repetition.
Our findings indicate that the impact of the foster child variable on education depends on
whether the child has access to the Programme of Advancement through Health and Education,
a conditional cash transfer programme instituted by the Jamaican government to improve
human capital development. In terms of school attendance, we find that while PATH improves
the attendance of biological children, it tends to reduce the attendance of foster children to
school. With regard to the number of years of schooling, on the other hand, we find that
although foster children are generally disadvantaged relative to biological children, a foster
child with access to PATH completes more years of schooling than a foster child who has no
access to the programme. In fact, foster children who live within households that benefit from
PATH complete 0.3% more years of schooling than a biological child who has access to PATH.
In sum, these results show that PATH has been quite effective in improving the educational
outcomes of Jamaican children, even those in foster care.
We also find that other household characteristics such as the gender and marital status of
the household head, the assets of the household, and the different forms of income the household
receives also affect both school attendance and the number of years of schooling accumulated.
For instance, we show that children in single-mother households and households that own a
television set tend to complete more years of schooling. The opposite is true for children who
belong to households that receive property income and own a radio. We also find that children
who belong to households that own their dwelling place or receive support from family living
elsewhere specifically for the children are more likely to be present in school. On the other
hand, children in households that receive remittances or windfall receipts tend to be absent
from school more often.
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Lastly, it is important to remember that our data set allows us to investigate only the kind of
fostering that results from the relocation of parents and not children. Although this is common
in Jamaica and the Caribbean in general, it needs to be taken into account when considering
the external validity of our results and its implications for policy formulation and evaluation.
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Appendix 4.A Sample Selection Bias
Table 4.A.1: Sample Selection Bias




Age squared -0.0070*** 0.0023
Foster child -0.0682 0.1273
Attends public school -0.2472** 0.1055
Walks to school -0.1516** 0.0752
Has a chronic disease 0.0349 0.1073
Household Characteristics
Owns home 0.1047 0.0895
Owns a radio 0.0816 0.0751
Owns a television set -0.2079 0.1314
Connected to electricity 0.0090 0.1522
Receives support for children -0.0256 0.0799
Receives remittances -0.0752 0.0732
Receives rental income 0.3216 0.3334
Receives windfall income -0.0678 0.1472
Number of adults -0.0593 0.0711
Number of preschoolers -0.2309*** 0.0712
Proportion of boys -0.1144 0.1357
Sex ratio of biological children 0.0257 0.0543
Extended family 0.1767* 0.1036
Total expenditure per capita 0.1689** 0.0731
PATH beneficiary -0.0990 0.1014
PATH beneficiary*Foster child 0.0507 0.1613
Household Head Characteristics
Single father -0.2123 0.2004
Female with spouse -0.3608*** 0.1240
Single mother -0.2699** 0.1202
Age -0.0109*** 0.0038
Completed tertiary education 0.1387 0.1325
Has a chronic disease 0.1124 0.0853
Area Characteristics
Other urban area (not KMA) -0.0058 0.1292
Rural area -0.0008 0.1209
Distance to nearest primary school 0.0014 0.0019
Distance to nearest secondary school 0.0179 0.0150
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
KMA stands for Kingston Metropolitan Area
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Appendix 4.B A Father’s Impact
Table 4.B.1: A Father’s Impact
Attendance Years of Schooling
Variables Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr
Child Characteristics
Age 0.0004 0.0080 0.1495*** 0.0087
Age squared -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0039*** 0.0003
Mother present -0.0173 0.0106 0.0045 0.0077
Father present 0.0170* 0.0102 0.0264** 0.0113
Attends public school 0.0051 0.0069 0.0225** 0.0102
Walks to school 0.0149 0.0095 -0.0053 0.0062
Has a chronic disease -0.0055 0.0089 0.0096 0.0081
Household Characteristics
Owns home 0.0196** 0.0094 0.0045 0.0085
Owns a radio 0.0055 0.0066 -0.0090* 0.0047
Owns a television set 0.0155 0.0158 0.0186** 0.0086
Connected to electricity 0.0110 0.0167 -0.0144 0.0120
Receives support for children 0.0197** 0.0076 0.0006 0.0050
Receives remittances -0.0125* 0.0067 0.0037 0.0049
Receives rental income 0.00004 0.0155 -0.0352** 0.0139
Receives windfall income -0.0223** 0.0109 0.0108 0.0069
Number of adults 0.0073 0.0148 0.0075 0.0108
Number of preschoolers 0.0087 0.0074 -0.0015 0.0062
Proportion of boys -0.0054 0.0212 -0.0198 0.0186
Sex ratio of biological children -0.0031 0.0077 0.0031 0.0066
Extended family -0.0131 0.0126 -0.0052 0.0086
Total expenditure per capita -0.0029 0.0082 -0.0020 0.0053
PATH beneficiary 0.0176 0.0124 0.0043 0.0086
Household Head Characteristics
Single father 0.0344 0.0312 0.0006 0.0218
Female with spouse -0.0031 0.0196 0.0271 0.0178
Single mother -0.0125 0.0297 0.0588** 0.0252
Age 0.0027 0.0036 -0.0040 0.0027
Completed tertiary education -0.0088 0.0140 -0.0134 0.0094
Has a chronic disease -0.0094 0.0086 0.0024 0.0055
Area Characteristics
Other urban area (not KMA) -0.0025 0.0067 -0.0331 0.0675
Rural area 0.0479 0.0429 0.0202 0.0732
Distance to nearest primary school 0.0001** 0.00003 0.0003*** 0.00003
Distance to nearest secondary school -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002*** 0.00003
Time Dummies yes yes
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
KMA stands for Kingston Metropolitan Area
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Appendix 4.C Household Fixed Effects
Table 4.C.1: Household Fixed Effects
Attendance Years of Schooling
Variables Estimate StdErr Estimate StdErr
Child Characteristics
Age 0.1553 0.1022 0.4869*** 0.0367
Age squared -0.0093* 0.0049 0.0200*** 0.0019
Foster child 0.6299*** 0.1805 -0.2945*** 0.0761
Attends public school 0.1536 0.1430 0.1900*** 0.0607
Walks to school 0.2383 0.1634 -0.0764 0.0493
Has a chronic disease 0.0491 0.1849 0.0046 0.0686
Household Characteristics
Owns home 0.4077** 0.1969 0.0429 0.0740
Owns a radio 0.0811 0.1456 -0.0448 0.0406
Owns a television set 0.3627 0.3435 0.1682** 0.0740
Connected to electricity 0.1848 0.3645 -0.1061 0.1021
Receives support for children 0.2788* 0.1628 0.0325 0.0466
Receives remittances -0.2408* 0.1449 0.0276 0.0450
Receives rental income -0.0580 0.3199 -0.2451** 0.1215
Receives windfall income -0.4314* 0.2469 0.1130 0.0795
Number of adults 0.1540 0.3138 0.0160 0.0874
Number of preschoolers 0.1435 0.1638 0.0055 0.0521
Proportion of boys 0.0263 0.4013 -0.0438 0.1496
Sex ratio of biological children 0.0369 0.1522 0.0144 0.0565
Extended family -0.3251 0.2657 -0.1048 0.0929
Total expenditure per capita -0.0410 0.1802 0.0006 0.0513
PATH beneficiary 0.5921** 0.2616 -0.0179 0.0777
PATH beneficiary*Foster child -0.8364*** 0.2529 0.1053 0.1028
Household Head Characteristics
Single father 0.4893 0.5183 0.0983 0.1851
Female with spouse -0.0714 0.3564 0.0354 0.2030
Single mother -0.4503 0.5430 0.2056 0.2243
Age 0.0414 0.0417 -0.0128 0.0235
Completed tertiary education -0.1038 0.2843 -0.1169 0.0911
Has a chronic disease -0.1928 0.1855 -0.0043 0.0514
Area Characteristics
Other urban area (not KMA) 0.0847 0.1925 -0.1919 0.5712
Rural area 1.2115 1.0005 0.2067 0.6091
Distance to nearest primary school 0.0019** 0.0008 0.0029*** 0.0004
Distance to nearest secondary school -0.0027 0.0027 0.0018*** 0.0004
Time Dummies yes yes
Standard errors robust to all forms of heteroskedasticity. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01




The three essays of this thesis examine relevant aspects of development including child
welfare, poverty, inequality, and gender using empirical methods. To do this, intra-household
decisions on resource allocation and child fostering are investigated using data from nation-wide
household surveys conducted in Ghana and Jamaica.
The first and second essays apply a modern collective model to estimate individual resource
shares in Ghanaian and Jamaican nuclear households respectively. Generally, the results from
both papers point to the fact that the welfare of children is closely connected to the welfare
of the woman within the household. In other words, improving the well-being of mothers is
likely to improve the well-being of children as well. In Ghana, for instance, we find that a
larger proportion of the cost of children (in terms of household expenditure at least) falls on
the mother. Hence, women and children tend to be more vulnerable to poverty than men.
In Jamaica, the resource share estimates show that children tend to receive larger resource
shares in female-headed households than in male-headed households. This means that children
in relatively poorer female-headed households are somewhat buffered from poverty because a
larger share of resources is allocated to them.
Still on the well-being of the child, both papers find some evidence of gender bias albeit in
different forms. In Ghanaian households, with respect to clothing and footwear at least, we
find strong evidence that parents tend to spend more on the girl child than on the boy child.
We argue that this characteristic stems from the maternal system of inheritance and succession
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practised by the largest ethnic group in the country since women in this culture are viewed as
the maintainers of the lineage or clan. In contrast, female heads (especially single mothers) in
Jamaica tend to favour boys to girls because the boy child is more likely to begin to contribute
significantly to household income since boys tend to enter the labour market earlier than girls
do. We find no evidence of gender bias in male-headed households in Jamaica.
The final paper of the thesis focuses on the impact of a child’s fostering status on his or
her education. School attendance is used to estimate short-term effects while long-term effects
are estimated using the number of years of schooling. The results show that being a foster
child in itself does not impact a child’s attendance to school. However, a foster child tends to
accumulate significantly less schooling years than a non-foster child. This means that although
the practice of leaving children with extended family or friends does not seem to affect their
education in the short run, it could have some negative long-term effects since the number
of years of schooling an individual has is an important determinant of his/her labour and
health outcomes in the future. Finally, findings from this essay also indicate that access to
Jamaica’s main social protection programme (the Programme of Advancement through Health
and Education) significantly influences the relationship between child fostering and education.
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